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Abstract 
This paper will assess whether interconnectedness between hard and soft power 
sources can be found in the economic features of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. A 
theoretical backdrop will firstly be provided for the reader, using the conceptual 
understandings on soft power by Joseph Nye, as well as discussions within the field of 
soft power, seeking to explain in which instances interconnectedness between hard 
and soft power comes to show. We will hereafter transfer these understandings to the 
empirical evidence, trying to analyze whether the soft power source of a positive 
Nigerian public perception towards the Chinese is correlated to the economic traits of 
the Sino-Nigerian relationship. To further strengthen this analytical structure, we will 
in disclosure take account for the Nigerian media’s discourse on the subject of these 
economic facets, coming to the conclusion that the relationship is portrayed 
predominantly positive in the media as well. We will additionally debate whether this 
report has enough leverage to verify the linkage between hard and soft power in the 
Sino-Nigerian economic relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
“From less than USD 2 billion in 2000, trade between China and Nigeria reached 
nearly USD 18 billion just ten years later. (...) (China’s) attractions (towards Nigeria) 
are clear: vast energy reserves and a large domestic market of 150 million 
inhabitants with growing disposable incomes. For Nigeria, incentives lie in China’s 
own successful economic transformation, its capacity to deliver large-scale 
infrastructure projects and more importantly, its ability to finance them” (Egbula & 
Zheng, 2011, s. 3). 
 
This is an introductory quote from West African Challenges, China and Nigeria: A 
Powerful South-South Alliance, a report conducted for The Sahel and West Africa 
Club Secretariat (SWAC). The overall evaluation of the report informs an 
increasingly intensified relationship between Nigeria and China, portraying 
interdependence between these two nations, and assesses the relationship in terms of 
trade, oil, aid, diplomatic relations, and social/cultural connections. 
Interrelated, indications show that Chinese domestic demands for crude oil, to 
withstand its manufacturing capabilities and transportation needs, will result in 77% 
of Chinese oil consumption deriving from imports by 2030 (Lee & Shalmon, 2008, s. 
110). Meanwhile, Nigeria holds the second largest oil reserves in Africa, where 37.2 
billion barrels of oil are proven to exist on Nigerian soil (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2012). Signs are showing that Nigeria is one of the African countries, 
where China is increasingly becoming engaged in terms of trade and economic 
cooperation. For example, Nigeria has become the second largest exporting market 
for Chinese goods in Africa, according to the Chinese embassy in Nigeria (Embassy 
of the People's Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013). 
Furthermore, state-to-state visits between the two nations are becoming more 
frequent, and events such as presidential visits have resulted in many bilateral 
agreements signed between the Chinese and Nigerian governments. Most recently 
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan visited China in July 2013, where several 
agreements were signed to promote financial, trade, economic, technical and cultural 
relations between China and Nigeria (Vanguard, 2013A). 
A quick glance at the Sino-Nigerian relationship seems to reveal that economic 
cooperation plays an important role in explaining why the two nations are engaged 
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with one another. If we seek to interpret this factor from the academic field of 
International Relations (IR), the notion of power is often operationalized with, in an 
attempt to describe interaction between two nations. The aspect of economic 
cooperation has often been interpreted as a hard power concept, where the gains 
being made from this economic state-to-state interaction revolve around the tangible 
and visible outcomes that come as a result.  
In the meantime, greater attention in the IR field is being directed towards 
explaining the Sino-African relationship from a soft power perspective. For example, 
Joshua Kurlantzick argues that China’s soft use of power in Africa ”has had 
significant policy implications, producing many favourable outcomes for China, one 
of the key definitions of successful wielding of soft power” (Kurlantzick, China's Soft 
Power in Africa, 2009, s. 167). 
Joseph Nye who first coined the term of soft power in his 1990 book Bound to 
Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes basically that power is “the 
ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye, 2004, 
s. 2). Nye explained that one way to influence others is through the use of hard power, 
which entails using inducements or threats, but it is also possible to “get the outcomes 
you want without tangible threats or payoffs” (Nye, 2004, s. 5), by instead relying on 
the ability to shape the preferences of others; co-opting them instead of coercing them 
(Nye, 2004, s. 5). This second way of achieving desired outcomes for a state, through 
soft power, is possible if other nations want to follow it, for example because they 
admire its values, emulate its example, or aspire to its level of prosperity and 
openness (Nye, 2004, s. 5). Nye argues that in this way it is possible to indirectly 
influence others and attain the outcomes that one desires (Nye, 2004, s. 5). 
Nye claimed that the “soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: 
its culture (…), its political values (…), and its foreign policies” (Nye, 2004, s. 11). 
These are quite intangible concepts of what determine resources, why measuring soft 
power is in many respects somewhat difficult. Though, Nye does seek to define how 
one can make a soft power assessment, namely when he explains that “soft power 
depends upon credibility” (Nye, 2011, s. 83), and that “soft power depends more than 
hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers” (Nye, 2004, s. 
16). He bridges these two arguments by elaborating that governments not alone 
dictate and control credibility, because the public-citizen level is the main domain 
consisting of these receivers and interpreters. Thus, the public perception of another 
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country becomes one of the essential means in seeking to evaluate soft power, 
because public society is the main receiver of foreign culture, foreign political values 
and foreign policies. For this reason public perception will serve as the main soft 
power source we in this paper will be looking at. 
The BBC World Service conducts a series of surveys each year, gathering 
information on public perception of the Chinese in a variety of foreign countries. In 
chart 1 below we have plotted in the available information from the BBC polls, 
covering a seven-year timespan, displaying Nigerian public perceptions towards the 
Chinese. 
Sources: 2006 (BBC World Service, GlobeScan and PIPA, 2006), 2007 (BBC World 
Service, Globescan and PIPA, 2007), 2008 (BBC World Service, Globescan and 
PIPA, 2008), 2009 (BBC World Service, Globescan and PIPA, 2009), 2010 (BBC 
World Service, Globescan and PIPA, 2010), 2011 (BBC World Service, Globescan 
and PIPA, 2011), 2012 (BBC World Service, Globescan and PIPA, 2012), 2013 (BBC 
World Service, Globescan and PIPA, 2013)  
 
Gathering the polls illustrates a general Nigerian positivity towards the Chinese, 
which the Nigerian public has had for the past seven years. In a comparable 
perspective, the other African countries included in the survey all had a lower 
percentage of positive views towards the Chinese in 2013: Ghana 68%, Kenya 58%, 
Egypt 57%. If we parallel these findings with Nye’s understanding of public 
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perception, we have an indication that China attains a valuable source of soft power in 
Nigeria. 
Taking into consideration that the economic facets seem to play a pivotal role in 
the Sino-Nigerian relationship, an interesting question arises: is the positive public 
perception towards the Chinese in Nigeria correlated to the picture of the Sino-
Nigerian economic cooperation? And related, is there interconnectedness between the 
traditionally viewed hard power elements of economic gains and the soft power 
source of positive public perception? 
Nye’s theoretical framework on soft power also deals with this question of whether 
interconnectedness between hard and soft power can exist, and adds that “Sometimes 
in real-world situations, it is difficult to distinguish what part of an economic 
relationship is composed of hard power and what is made up of soft power” (Nye, 
2011, s. 85). 
This will be the revolving point and academic contribution of this paper, seeking to 
demonstrate interconnectedness between hard and soft power dimensions, when 
analyzing the economic facets of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. In our pursuit of 
coming to this understanding of interconnectedness, we will seek to illustrate 
correlation between the economic Sino-Nigerian relationship and the positive 
Nigerian public perception towards the Chinese. Dealing with this objective, we have 
chosen to focus on various topics related to this subject of interconnectedness in 
regards to the Sino-Nigerian economic partnership, namely (1) the Sino-Nigerian 
economic relationship regarding the Nigerian oil sector and the general aspect of 
Sino-Nigerian trade, (2) presidential visits between the two nations in a broad 
perspective and an in-depth analysis of the most recent visit by Goodluck Jonathan to 
China, (3) interpreting the Chinese South-South cooperation strategy and the Chinese 
economic developmental model, (4) an in-depth analysis of Nigerian public 
perception surveys towards the Chinese, and (5) a quantitative analysis of the 
Nigerian media’s depiction of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. The analytical structure 
of our research design will in further depth be elaborated upon in the chapter of 
methodology. We have devised following thesis statement, which implicitly will 
serve as navigational tool throughout this paper. 
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1.1. Thesis Statement 
Investigating the economic features of the Sino-Nigerian relationship, together with 
the Nigerian media’s portrayal of this subject, projects an image of correlation 
between the hard and soft power elements at play, when paralleled with the findings 
of a positive Nigerian public perception towards the Chinese.  
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2. Methodology 
In this chapter we will present our methodological approach, specifying the central 
elements of our research design in highlighting the interconnectedness between hard 
and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian relationship. Thus, we will be addressing why and 
how we seek to illuminate the facets of our thesis statement and provide an insight to 
the quality of our method of reasoning. 
In researching the correlation between hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship, we have relied on several empirical sources and different analytical 
strategies. The main objective that our methodological considerations must address is 
how we seek to portray soft power through the hard power economic facets of the 
Sino-Nigerian relationship, why we have chosen to make use of two very important 
empirical sources in this regard: (1) surveys/polls of the Nigerian public perception of 
the Chinese, and (2) two separate analyses of the Nigerian media’s portrayal of the 
Sino-Nigerian relationship. 
We will first introduce our theoretical considerations in this chapter, explaining 
why we have made use of particular authors on the subject of soft power and its 
correlation to hard power. Hereafter we will showcase our analytical approach and 
strategy together with empirical considerations, where we will explain how we seek to 
highlight the economic aspects of the Sino-Nigerian relationship, and justify why the 
choices made throughout our research have been the most optimal in respect to our 
specific subject. Lastly, we will address which limitations our research design bears. 
 
2.1. Theoretical considerations 
This theoretical subchapter will provide background information to the main 
theoretical authors used in the paper and argue for the relevance of their theories. The 
definition ‘main theorists’ refers to theorists being directly operationalized with in the 
paper, leaving Dahl, Bachrach & Baratz, Lukes, and theorists without their own 
subchapter out of this methodological subchapter. 
 
2.1.1. Joseph Nye: soft power 
Joseph Nye’s theories stand especially relevant to this paper because we mainly will 
be addressing how soft power can be comprehended in the Sino-Nigerian economic 
relationship. 
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Joseph Nye has been associated to the Harvard University for many years, and was 
the first to coin the term of soft power in his 1990 book Bound to Lead: The Changing 
Nature of American Power. In 2004 Nye elaborated in further depth upon the notion 
of soft power with his book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 
Although several authors have since written on the subject of soft power, they have 
most likely all related to Nye’s theoretical framework. Nye’s framework thus seems 
the most relevant to our research area, as it simply put is the reference point amongst 
the soft power literature. 
Nye’s writings on the subject of soft power do not exclude hard power 
considerations, which he also extensively elaborates upon in his works on soft power. 
For this reason we did not see it necessary to also include a theoretical approach 
solely dealing with hard power, because Nye does not contest the existence of hard 
power; rather, soft power is a theoretical understanding complementary to the wider 
debate about power within the academic field of International Relations (IR). 
Nye elaborates to a great extent on the subject of interconnectedness between hard 
and soft power, but we have chosen to include three additional authors on the subject 
as well, adding an extra dimension to what we can deliberate upon, when dealing with 
the subject of interconnectedness. 
 
2.1.2. Li, Hayden and Gallarotti: interconnectedness of hard and 
soft power 
Providing a theoretical continuation to Joseph Nye’s notion of the interconnectedness 
of hard and soft power, we will make use of three theorists and their respective views 
on soft power: (1) Mingjiang Li, editor of the book Soft Power: China's Emerging 
Strategy in International Politics, has written about Chinese soft power and expresses 
that there can be a soft use of power, thus dealing with the subject of 
interconnectedness. (2) Craig Hayden, author of the book The Rhetoric of Soft Power: 
Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts from 2012, questions the subject of correlation 
between resources of power and certain outcomes. (3) Giulio Gallarotti whose article, 
Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use, 
tackles the broader notion of soft power, seeking to determine its value as either an 
actor-based theory or structurally founded theoretical concept. We will mainly use 
these theories in our discussion, where we from a theoretical perspective will address 
some of the issues that this research design is characterized by. 
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2.2. Analytical and empirical considerations 
This subchapter will explain why and how we have chosen the analytical approach we 
use in this paper. The subchapter will thus explain our analytical (why) as well as our 
empirical considerations (how) of the analysis. In order to provide the best possible 
overview, this subchapter will be divided on the basis of these three parts of the 
analysis. However, since some methods have been used in more than one analytical 
section, and we do not wish to repeat ourselves, we will make it very clear to the 
reader, when a methodological consideration also considers another part of the 
analysis. This also means that the explanation of the discourse analysis, which is used 
for the two last analytical sections will have its very own paragraph.  
Consequently, this methodological subchapter will be divided as follows: Overall 
analytical considerations; Hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian relationship 
(first analysis part); Discourse analysis (concerning second and third analysis parts); 
Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to China (second analysis part); and The portrayal of the 
Sino-Nigerian relationship (third and last analytical part). 
 
2.2.1. Overall analytical considerations 
Our analytical approach wishes to highlight elements in the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship, which can portray interconnectedness between hard and soft power 
facets. The subject of interconnectedness can take many forms and can potentially 
touch upon several dimensions of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. For example a study 
on the subject of culture in the Sino-Nigerian relationship could have portrayed how 
the element of culture, which is typically interpreted as a soft power source, might 
have a hard power element to it as well. We therefore felt that narrowing down the 
scope on the subject of interconnectedness was necessary. This analytical choice will 
yield a research design that with greater clarity can justify what it is we claim to have 
achieved in this paper. 
Our method, in an attempt to further narrow the analytical scope of this broader 
subject of interconnectedness, was to look at the economic relationship as an 
analytical point of departure and using this specific aspect of interconnectedness as 
the pivotal point that we wished to deliberate upon. As the reader might have 
remarked in our introductory chapter, we introduced Nye’s point in argument that 
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distinguishing between hard and soft power was a difficult task when inspecting an 
economic relationship. We felt this analytical scope was highly relevant in relation to 
the Sino-Nigerian relationship, interpreted in the light of how the economic facets are 
(1) very visible in this partnership, (2) the economic gains made as a result of this 
partnership seem to be the main driver as to explaining why the two nations are 
engaged, and (3) the economic facets touch upon two important dimensions that help 
us elaborate on the correlation between hard and soft power, namely the state-to-state 
relationship factors of presidential visits and the South-South cooperation strategy, 
interpreted in the light of economic aid and a desirable Chinese economic 
developmental model1. 
With the economic facets as a revolving point for this paper, the cultural element 
of soft power becomes sidelined. We might have been able to link this aspect to the 
economic facets we are dealing with in this paper, but the very point in choosing the 
economic facet as a pivotal analytical point was to narrow the scope of analysis. In 
our research of the Sino-Nigerian relationship, where we found that cultural aspects 
could be identified2, they typically stood as separate events having little to do with the 
wider picture of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. In summary, the exclusion of culture 
as a soft power source in our research design means that this paper will rely more on 
the soft power aspects of values and foreign policy. The next forthcoming paragraphs 
will explain how we wish to deliberate upon these elements. 
 
2.2.2. Hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian relationship 
This paragraph will contain analytical and empirical considerations on the first part of 
the analysis, Hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian relationship. 
 
Why: Analytical considerations 
We will in our analysis try to highlight how the Chinese economic partnership with 
Nigeria can be seen from a hard power angle of tangibility and soft power in terms of 
intangibility, and lastly how the two are interconnected. The hard power facets are in 
                                                
1 Below we deliberate on how this is the case that the elements of South-South cooperation and the 
state-to-state relationship serve as subjects that overlap both hard and soft power elements. 
2 Confucius Institutes are Chinese public institutes that seek to promote Chinese culture and language 
in countries abroad, and two of these institutes are to be found in Nigeria for example. The Chinese 
have also assisted the Nigerians in completing their first satellite, The NIGERCOMSAT, showcasing 
an exchange of technology and knowledge, which typically is considered a soft power cultural aspect 
(Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 277) 
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this respect quite easy to identify, because the economic gains being made by the two 
nations are documented and very visible, for example through bilateral agreements 
signed between Nigeria and China. Specifically we will make use of four dimensions 
to highlight the point of the hard power aspects: (1) the economic partnership in 
regards to the Nigerian oil sector, (2) a broad overview of the trade relations between 
the two nations, (3) state-to-state visits and the signing of bilateral agreements, (4) the 
Chinese South-South cooperation strategy, looking at Chinese aid and the Chinese 
economic developmental model.  
The two former dimensions take a specific hard power angle, while the two latter 
factors will be used as crossover points to the soft power assets that we wish to 
highlight. One of the difficult tasks in our research design is to demonstrate and 
justify how these latter mentioned elements of the economic Sino-Nigerian 
relationship, can actually be perceived as soft power features. For one we wish to 
underscore that the Chinese economic model can be viewed as a means of attraction, 
and how the Sino-Nigerian economic partnership in itself, can be viewed as a soft 
power symbol, not alone revolving around the hard power economic gains being 
made as a result of bilateral agreements. We will seek to illustrate this by highlighting 
an intensified state-to-state relationship between the two nations, which might 
indicate that the Nigerian government seeks to emulate the Chinese, attracted towards 
their business style and economic model. 
An important facet in this context of desirability towards the Chinese economic 
model is the public perception as well, in that a positive perception in foreign publics 
serves as an important soft power source (Nye, 2011, s. 94). What we seek to 
illustrate in this section of the analysis, is how the Chinese economic developmental 
model (in relation to the Chinese aid model) has become a symbol of soft power and 
thereby also has become a soft power value. Furthermore, the Chinese economic 
developmental model should be interpreted in the light of the South-South 
cooperation strategy that the Chinese government has laid forth, why this topic also 
deals with the subject of foreign policies, which Nye views as one of the main soft 
power sources. 
 
How: Empirical considerations 
Since public perception plays an important role in regard to soft power, as explained 
in the introduction, we have chosen to make use of several polls/surveys in our 
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analysis of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. The polls we have at our disposal will 
mainly be used in (1) highlighting a positive Nigerian public perception towards the 
Chinese, and (2) attempting to demonstrate that the public perception is 
interconnected to the hard power facets of the Sino-Nigerian relationship.  
We have mainly used polls from the Pew Research Center3 in our analysis, where 
three data sets from 2007, 2010, and 2013 will be evaluated. One of the assets of the 
Pew Polls are their varying formulations and different framings, though they in 
general terms just seek to illustrate public perception towards other countries.  
The first survey-set we make use of from the Pew Research Center are three 
opinion polls from 2007, which display perceptions from all the African countries 
included in the survey. These polls from 2007 parallel Chinese influence in African 
countries to African perceptions of Americans. The sample-base from the 2007 
survey consists of 1,128 respondents from Nigeria. It was conducted face-to-face and 
covered a national base (Pew Global, 2007, s. 75). 
In 2010 and in 2013 the Pew Research Center conducted a survey in Nigeria on 
which view the Nigerians had towards the Chinese. The sample size in 2010 was 
based on 1000 respondents, was conducted face-to-face, and targeted various regions 
in Nigeria (Pew Global, 2010). Unfortunately, the Pew Research Center does not 
publish their methodology until two years after the initial numbers are released, 
meaning that the number of respondents from 2013 is unknown, though we do assume 
that the 2013 surveys meet the same standards that the 2007 and 2010 surveys 
portray. In the analysis we have plotted the available data into four separate graphs, 
and represent the positive views towards China. Remark that not all the questions 
have responses from both years. 
In the chapter of Introduction, we will make use of the BBC World Service poll, 
conducted by the polling firm GlobeScan and the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. Thus, this poll is not included in the 
analytical subchapter of Hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian relationship, but it 
will serve as a reference point throughout the paper. It has been included in this 
methodological paragraph in order to explain it together with the rest of the polls. 
The BBC World Service polls are conducted yearly with the intention of 
portraying public perception of other countries, where the categorizations of 
                                                
3 A nonpartisan fact tank that mostly informs on the American perception in other countries, though 
they do also include survey-opinions on the perception of the Chinese 
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responses either fall into a mainly negative category or a mainly positive category. To 
the advantage of this paper, the poll also singles out which perception the Nigerians 
have towards the Chinese, and have been doing so since 2006. We have gathered the 
information and plotted them into a graph using the same categorization. It should be 
noted that the number of respondents in Nigeria has ranged between 800 and 1000 
within this timespan we are dealing with, but the sample-base should be large enough 
to draw a general conclusion on the results. Furthermore, the survey methodology has 
both consisted of face-to-face questionnaires as well as telephone surveys, whilst 
mostly national surveys were conducted in contrast to ‘urban’ surveys. 
The last survey at our disposal is very small in scale with only 23 respondents, 
performed by the Centre for Law and Social Action, Lagos, in 2007 and 2008, which 
asked Nigerian traders which sort of influence the Chinese presence had upon them 
and their business. This poll will only be used in reference to the subject on Sino-
Nigerian trade, more specifically as an example in regards to the Nigerian textiles 
industry. Three questions were asked and are displayed in cursive, while the 
responses are beneath each question, falling into different categorical responses. 
Unfortunately we have not been able to find any polls specific on the subject of 
attraction towards the Chinese economic development model. Such a poll would have 
helped immensely in illuminating correlation between a positive public perception 
and attraction towards the Chinese economic model. In the last part of this 
methodological chapter we will discuss which limitations that preside in our research 
design, which tackles this question of unknown correlation between public perception 
and soft power attraction towards the Chinese in Nigeria. 
 
2.2.3. Discourse analysis 
Our methodological approach in analyzing the Nigerian media (in the two last 
analytical subchapters) takes the form of a discourse analysis, where we seek to 
illuminate which discourse the media is presenting. We will in this section, with the 
help of Jennifer Milliken’s journal article The Study of Discourse in International 
Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods assess, from a theoretical 
methodological standpoint, lay out what implications a discourse analysis will bear 
for this paper and our analytical method. This methodological paragraph will thus 
concern the two analytical subchapters Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to China and The 
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portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship, since both sections assess articles/opinion 
pieces through a discourse analysis. 
 
According to Jennifer Milliken, three theoretical commitments are highly important in 
the area of discourse analyses (Milliken, 1999, s. 228), and she takes “these three 
theoretical commitments as presuppositions of discourse analysis” (Milliken, 1999, s. 
230). We will now briefly introduce these commitments as Milliken presents them. 
 
The first commitment is to a concept of discourse as structures of signification which 
construct social realities. Underlying this commitment is a constructivist understanding 
of meaning – things do not mean (the material world does not convey meaning); rather, 
people construct the meaning of things, using sign systems (predominantly, but not 
exclusively linguistic) (Milliken, 1999, s. 229). 
 
In our paper this will signify that the meaning, or the social reality, of the 
relationship between China and Nigeria is not something that is given, but something 
that is given meaning by the discourse about this relationship – what the relationship 
means is something that is constructed by the discourse. Thus, it could for example be 
said that if someone argues that the Sino-Nigerian relationship is beneficial for 
Nigeria, because it brings investments into Nigeria, it is not a fact that it is beneficial, 
but the meaning of investments as beneficial becomes constructed as a social reality 
through a discourse. 
 
The second theoretical commitment is to discourses as being productive (or 
reproductive) of things defined by the discourse. The point here is that beyond giving a 
language for speaking about (analyzing, classifying) phenomena, discourses make 
intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing 
a particular ‘regime of truth’ while excluding other possible modes of identity and action 
(Milliken, 1999, s. 229). 
 
Again, for us this will signify that the ‘truth’ about the phenomenon of the Sino-
Nigerian relationship is something that is being operationalized by the discourse. 
When someone argues that the relationship is positive or negative, they are producing 
a ‘truth’ about the relationship through their language by operationalizing the 
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relationship, but as Milliken also points out, one does operationalize with a particular 
‘regime of truth’, leaving out other (unknown) truths. 
Milliken then moves into explaining the third commitment, arguing that 
 
the theoretical commitment of discourse productivity directs us towards studying 
dominating or hegemonic discourses, and their structuring of meaning as connected to 
implementing practices and ways of making these intelligible and legitimate. However, 
even if dominating discourses are ‘grids of intelligibility’ for large numbers of people, 
the third commitment is to all discourses as being unstable grids, requiring work to 
‘articulate’ and ‘rearticulate’ their knowledges and identities (to fix the ‘regime of 
truth’) and open-ended meshes, making discourses changeable and in fact historically 
contingent (Milliken, 1999, s. 230). 
 
This third commitment, which Milliken labels “The play of practice” (Milliken, 
1999, s. 230), signifies that the ‘meaning’ and ‘truth’ in the discourse about the Sino-
Nigerian relationships is not things that are stable, even if these are the dominant 
‘meaning’ and ‘truth’, but rather they are things that can be changed and contested 
over time. For this paper this last commitment implies that our ‘regime of truth’ will 
be shifting over time, why we never can analyze the full spectrum of truths. 
After identifying these three commitments, Milliken begins to explain certain 
approaches to analyzing discourses. For example she explains the method predicate 
analysis, which 
 
focuses on the language practice of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that 
attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort 
of thing, with particular features and capacities. Among the objects so constituted may 
be subjects, defined through being assigned capacities for and modes of acting and 
interacting” (Milliken, 1999, s. 232). 
 
This type of analysis seems to be very relevant to us, as we, in our newspaper 
analysis, will be looking at positive and negative opinions on the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship. In assessing whether an opinion, be it the opinion of a source or an actual 
opinion piece, is positive or negative, we will obviously be looking at what predicates 
they attach to the Sino-Nigerian relationship. If for example this relationship is 
described as “beneficial” by a source, we will use this predicate to determine that the 
source is positive on the relationship. 
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Furthermore, Milliken argues that “what is being proposed for predicate analysis 
is a process of empirical study and abstraction which goes hand in hand, in the sense 
that theoretical categories are drawn from and answer to the empirical data upon 
which a study is based” (Milliken, 1999, s. 234). This is also very relevant to us as we 
are conducting an empirical study, in which we are using categories such as 
“positive” and “negative” opinions on the Sino-Nigerian relationship that answer to 
the empirical data that we find in the newspaper articles. 
Concluding on this section, we can thus state that we will be investigating what 
‘meaning’ and ‘truth’ that are being constructed in the discourse of the newspapers on 
the Sino-Nigerian relationship, using a predicate analysis to determine whether these 
are positive or negative. Our goal with this will then be to determine whether the 
discourse affects China’s soft power in Nigeria. 
 
2.2.4. Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to China 
This methodological paragraph will elaborate on the analytical and the empirical 
considerations concerning the analytical subchapter Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to 
China. As we stress later in this section, the considerations on the empirical material 
(articles) will be elaborated in detail in the forthcoming methodological paragraph in 
the analytical subchapter The portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. 
 
Why: Analytical considerations 
With the factor that government actions might shape public perception in mind, we 
felt that analyzing state interaction between the two nations might correlate to how the 
Nigerian public perceived the Chinese, yielding insight as to whether the Chinese 
economic developmental model has become a soft power symbol. A subject that 
touches upon state-to-state interaction are the presidential visits between the two 
nations, why we in the first analytical section made a broader evaluation of this 
subject in our analysis, and in the second part of the analysis make an in-depth 
analysis of the most recent presidential visit, Nigerian President Jonathan’s visit to 
China in 2013. When speaking of presidential visits in general in this paragraph, the 
methodological considerations thus concern both the first and the second part of the 
analysis. 
The presidential visits give us an insight as to whether the Nigerians are attracted 
towards the aforementioned Chinese economic model, as we argue that an intensified 
 19 
relationship in this domain means that the Nigerian government views the Chinese as 
an important partner. The presidential visits thus become the arena, where Chinese 
foreign policy is displayed and shows whether the Nigerians are attracted towards 
these policies. If we consider the South-South cooperation strategy to be a foreign 
policy, then the state-to-state interaction will illustrate whether the Nigerians want to 
engage in this cooperation. Furthermore, we wish to portray how the presidential 
visits have become a symbol of soft power themselves, and thus also a specific soft 
power value. 
Our in-depth analysis of President Jonathan’s visit to China, making up the second 
part of the analysis, is used in this regard, as we will highlight through this specific 
event how the (elitist) debate in the media is portraying this interaction between the 
two nations as something positive. If the state-to-state relationship is viewed as 
something positive, we argue that the interaction between the two nations, through the 
media debate, becomes a soft power value. 
 
How: Empirical considerations 
For this section, we used the same search method as in the subchapter The portrayal 
of the Sino-Nigerian relationship (explained in the next methodological paragraph) to 
find the articles that we use. However, while we in that subchapter will only use news 
articles in our analysis, we will in this analytical section just use these news stories 
concerning the event to give background information to what was dealt with during 
the visit, and thus the statements made by participants of the event will only be used 
for this background information. The criteria for inclusion of articles in the two 
subchapters will also be different, as we in this section will use opinion pieces, a 
category we will omit in the content analysis. This should enable us to make a deeper 
analysis of how this event was debated in the Nigerian newspapers, as we will here 
include pieces that are not supposed to be neutral – in contrast to regular news stories. 
Thus, we wish to highlight how the opinion pieces, in the elitist part of the debate on 
this symbolic event reflect the Nigerian perceptions of the relationship with China, 
and therefore the analysis in this section will primarily deal with these opinion pieces. 
Further, it should be noted that we in this section only use articles that are 
somehow related to the presidential visit – pieces that are dealing specifically with the 
visit, which give background information in relation to it, or which somehow assess 
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it. All opinion pieces that have lived up to these criteria, of the 129 articles found in 
total, have been included in this analysis. 
 
2.2.5. The portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship 
This paragraph will explain our analytical and empirical considerations concerning 
the last part of the analysis, The portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. This part 
of the analysis contains several technical implications concerning the gathering of 
empirical material (news articles) as well as the coding of this material. Thus, the 
many technical explanations, resulting in a large paragraph, are necessary for the 
reader to fully understand our methodological actions. 
As explained in the foregoing methodological paragraph on the analytical section 
of Goodluck Jonathan’s visit in China, the gathering of articles also concerns this part 
of the analysis. 
This methodological paragraph will end by showing examples of what we have 
based our coding choices on. 
 
Why: Analytical considerations  
As a supplement to both of the soft power interconnected subjects, the South-South 
cooperation and the presidential visits, we have included a broad evaluation of the 
Nigerian media’s portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship and of China itself. In 
this section we have conducted a quantitative content analysis of Internet newspaper 
articles from 2013, where we evaluate whether the Nigerian media have either a 
positive, neutral or negative stance towards the relationship. 
We mentioned in the introduction that soft power depends upon credibility and that 
governments are not able to fully control this credibility. News media are also able to 
influence upon this credibility, for which reason it was interesting for us to examine 
the Nigerian news media for perceptions of China and its relationship with Nigeria. In 
order to get a contemporary image of these perceptions, the analytical subchapter 
Portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship will scrutinize 2013 articles from the four 
big Nigerian broadsheet newspapers The Guardian, Vanguard, The Punch, and This 
Day, featured on their respective webpages. 
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How: Empirical considerations 
Our time frame spans more precisely from January 1 to December 6, 2013, which is 
the date the search for the articles was conducted on all four webpages. A relatively 
short time span was chosen in order to limit the empirical material, which was 
necessary due to our limited time and resources. The year 2013 was chosen in order to 
get the most recent picture of the relationship, which will provide the paper with a 
continuation to the first part of our analysis that surveys the recent history of the 
relationship, and hopefully also contribute with an update of the existing research 
material on the subject China-Nigeria. 
Finding the most reliable, most politically independent, and widest read 
newspapers in a country, to which we have nothing but a distant academic 
relationship, can be a difficult matter. With nothing but Wikipedia and an unreliable 
source4, we therefore sought for alternative sources. The search led us to Sine 
Plambech, MA in anthropology and development studies and PhD student at Danish 
Institute for International Studies (DIIS), who has researched on and written several 
books about Nigeria. Plambech could not help us herself, but provided the contact to 
Busayo Iruemiobe, born, living, and working in Nigeria for BBC Media Action 
Nigeria, a branch of British BBC World Service. His email with his assessment of the 
newspaper market in Nigeria is included in Appendix A. As evident in the email, 
Iruemiobe considered The Guardian as the most serious Nigerian newspaper and This 
Day, The Punch, and Vanguard as some of the newspapers with the widest circulation 
in most major cities. He did not have information on which newspapers are in fact the 
most read across Nigeria. Our choice of the four newspapers The Guardian, 
Vanguard, Punch, and This Day is based on this assessment, since we have been 
unable to find more reliable sources. 
It must as well be noted that Iruemiobe’s evaluation of the newspapers concerns 
the paper versions and not the Internet versions. We have chosen the Internet versions 
solely based on the fact that it would be a nearly impossible cause to obtain all 2013 
articles on China-Nigeria from the paper versions. However, we argue that the 
Internet versions of the newspapers to a certain degree reflect the paper versions, 
concerning both share of readers (not amount) and reliability. Thus, we argue that the 
                                                
4 Onlinenewspapers.com: Top 50 Nigeria Newspapers: 
http://www.onlinenewspapers.com/Top50/Top50-CurrentNigeria.htm 
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use of sources and their quoted perceptions in the Internet versions reflect the use of 
sources and their quoted perceptions in the paper versions. 
The empirical evidence will consist of articles dealing with the relationship 
between Nigeria and China, and we will conduct the analysis by coding every article 
on the types of sources that are included in the article, and whether these sources are 
cited for positive or negative responses to the subject (for instance a Chinese 
investment in Nigerian aviation) as well as positive or negative quotes on China (for 
instance a source commending the Chinese economic model). Here it should be noted 
that a perception on a Chinese brand operating in Nigeria is coded as a perception on 
the relation and not on China. An example of this is provided in the paragraph 
Examples of coding choices. Thus, by coding the use of sources and a potential source 
bias, we are able to provide an image on how the Sino-Nigerian relationship is 
portrayed in the Nigerian media, and thus which image the Nigerian population 
receives. 
In order to narrow down our empirical ballast, we searched for the words “China” 
and “Nigeria” through the search engines on the respective webpages shown above. 
After searching for the words China Nigeria, we only chose the articles, where China 
or Chinese were included in the headline, in order to narrow our findings down to 
articles where China was the main subject. The other search word Nigeria made sure 
that Nigeria would be included somewhere in the article. This method of course risks 
excluding articles on China-Nigeria, since our screening has overlooked articles with, 
for instance, the name of a Chinese firm in the headline, or where China (or Chinese) 
in other ways is not featured in the headline, but where the article is still relevant to 
our analysis. This may have generated the result, that our coding analysis does not 
include all 2013 Internet news articles on China-Nigeria from the four newspapers. 
However, we argue that our sample of articles is big enough to provide validity, 
because the articles we have overlooked most likely contain the same use of sources 
as the articles in our sample. We thus see this problem as having little effect on the 
validity of our assessment. 
The search engines on The Guardian and This Day are both provided by Google, 
while the providers of the search engines on Vanguard and The Punch are unknown. 
The two Google search engines and the search engine on The Punch made sure that 
when searching for “China”, “Chinese” was also included, while on the search engine 
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of Vanguard we were able to write “China OR Chinese”, getting articles including 
either of the search words. 
We were left with 18 articles from The Guardian, 38 articles from Vanguard, 43 
articles from Punch, and 30 articles from This Day, resulting in empirical evidence of 
129 articles in total. 
In order to code the articles based on the same standards, a coding schedule 
containing different categories was made (Bryman, 2008, s. 283). The coding 
schedule is displayed in table 1 with article 116 used as an example, while the filled 
out coding schedule and the bibliography of the 129 articles is included in Appendix 
B. 
To understand the coding schedule, a coding manual is made, where the different 
numbers connected to the different types of sources (categories 2, 3, 4, 5), the letters 
connected to the different types of subjects (category 6), and the Roman numerals 
connected to the invalid category (category 7) are explained (Bryman, 2008, s. 283-
285). The coding manual is displayed in table 2. 
The categories can contain more than one number or letter, if for instance more 
than one source has spoken negatively on China, or if more than one subject is 
apparent in the article. As the categories do not include neutral perceptions, these 
have not been coded. As a result of these two methodological choices, the total quoted 
perceptions can both be higher or lower than the total amount of sources. As is 
apparent in the analysis, it was in our case lower. A quote can both be direct or 
indirect. Whenever we have been in doubt if a quote contained a perception, this 
quote has not been coded (rendering it neutral) in order to avoid cases where one 
coder would code differently than another coder. 
It should further be noted that an unknown number of sources expressing the same 
perception are only coded as one perception. For instance, “experts have said 
(something positive)” in article 124 (This Day, 2013A) has been coded as 13 in the 
category Positive on the relation. The full indirect quote can be seen in the paragraph 
Examples of coding choices, where it is used again. Likewise, more quotes from the 
same source only results in one number. 
In order to heighten the transparency of our selection method, we have included 
the category Invalid, where we, using Roman numerals, have shown on which basis 
the invalid articles have been left out. The categories are apparent in table 2. After 
removing irrelevant articles, we were left with 62 news articles concerning China-
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Nigeria relations having an effect on Nigeria. These are the ones that our analysis of 
the news articles is based on. 
 Table 1: The coding schedule, incl. article 116 as example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 
number 
Types of 
sources 
Positive on 
the relation 
Critical   on 
the relation 
Positive 
on China 
Critical 
on China Subject Invalid 
116 1, 2, 13 1, 2, 13 
 
2 
 
j 
 
 25 
Table 2: The coding manual5 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 The ”---” shows that this subject has been removed, after the coding was done, since the subject either 
did not appear in a single article, or we chose to merge two subjects based on our findings in the coding 
that led us to the conclusion that the interconnectedness of the two subjects was too big to divide the 
two. The removed subjects are shown in brackets. 
SOURCE 
1. Nigerian government representative / ministry (incl. spokesmen and 
advisers to ministers) 
2. Chinese government representative / ministry 
3. Nigerian oppositional politician 
4. Chinese oppositional voice 
5. Nigerian firm representative 
6. Chinese firm representative 
7. Nigerian organisation representative 
8. Chinese organisation representative 
9. Nigerian official / federal institution, excl. government (anyone 
connected to the state that is not a member of government) 
10. Chinese official / federal institution, excl. government 
11. Nigerian civilian 
12. Chinese civilian 
13. 3rd party (expert; commentator; foreign organisation; foreign firm; 
or others where nationality is irrelevant) 
14. Other (irrelevant to China-Nigeria) 
  
SUBJECT 
a. Investment 
b. Trade, China to Nigeria 
c. State loans/debt 
d. --- (Deleted: Selling of state company (added to e)) 
e. Outsourcing / selling of state company 
f. About Chinese firms operating in Nigeria 
g. Business cooperation 
h. Diplomatic visit/meeting 
i. Cultural event with Chinese participation 
j. Governmental/federal collaboration 
k. --- (Deleted: Cooperation between everything else than business and 
government) 
l. Trade, Nigeria to China 
m. Aid 
n. Discussing overall relationship  
o. Other 
  
INVALID 
I. China is not an important part of the subject 
II. Nigeria is not an important part of the subject 
III. Events taking place in China 
IV. Does not concern bilateral cooperation (e.g. Chinese criminals in 
Nigeria; sports events) 
V. Not a news (e.g. editorials; opinion letters; interviews) 
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Examples of coding choices 
In order to show how we have made our coding choices, we will in this paragraph 
show one example of each type of quote. This will provide an insight into how we 
have used the approach of discourse analysis to let certain words and phrases indicate 
either a positive or a negative statement. 
 
Positive on the relation 
In article 124, Nigeria, China Strengthen Trade, Investment Ties from This Day (This 
Day, 2013A) an unknown number of experts are indirectly quoted in the end of the 
article:  
 
Experts have said the Nigeria-China business forum could not have come at a better 
time than now as it would provide a veritable platform for the government and 
organised private sectors of both countries to strengthen their economic partnership, 
especially in the critical sectors of the economy (This Day, 2013A). 
 
This has been coded as 13 in the category positive on the relation due to its main 
argument that the discussed relation (a collaborative business forum) “could not have 
come at a better time than now”, which is a clear indication to the reader that the 
business forum must be beneficial for both countries. 
 
Critical on the relation 
In article 80, Can Nigerian dealer break the Chinese car jinx?, from The Punch (The 
Punch, 2013A), a Nigerian civilian is indirectly quoted concerning a Chinese car 
brand: 
 
For instance, a victim, who identifies himself simply as Dimeji, in a report published by 
nairaland.com, warns people to beware of the Chinese brand. He notes that they may be 
ridiculously cheap, but safety and quality are compromised, recalling how the airbag of 
one crushed car failed to deploy after somersaulting (The Punch, 2013A). 
 
This has been coded as 11 in critical on the relation due to the fact that he “warns 
people to beware of the Chinese brand”. As explained earlier, a quoted perception on 
Chinese brands operating in Nigeria is coded under the relation category and not 
under China. 
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Positive on China 
In article 6, China prescribes own economic model to Nigeria, others, from The 
Guardian (The Guardian, 2013A), the Chinese vice-minister on State Council of 
Information, Li Wufen, is quoted concerning China: 
 
“It has now been proven that China’s development model is correct. We have also 
realized that stability is crucial to attain sustainable development. We desire the 
Nigerian economy t (sic) grow on a sustainable basis” (The Guardian, 2013A). 
 
This has been coded as 2 in positive on China due to its statement that it “has been 
proven that China’s development model is correct”. Since it concerns the 
development model, which has influence on Nigeria, one might argue that the quote 
should be coded under relation instead of China. However, since the quote does not 
concern whether the development model has benefited Nigeria but merely speaks of 
the development model on its own and as a Chinese thing, it has been coded under the 
category China. 
 
Critical on China 
In article 63, China’s money flows to Nigeria amidst credit squeeze, from The Punch 
(The Punch, 2013B), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is indirectly quoted 
concerning the Chinese economy:  
 
The IMF said risks are increasing that China’s economic growth this year will fall short 
of the lender’s forecast as it urged the nation to follow through on policy reforms to 
sustain expansion (The Punch, 2013B). 
 
This has been coded as 13 in critical on China due to the forecast that Chinese 
economic growth cannot live up to its expectations, which leaves the reader a critical 
impression of the Chinese economy. The word risk and the phrase that it “will fall 
short of lender’s forecast” help providing this critical impression. 
 
No coding (neutral) 
In article 122, Nigeria, China Sign Agreement on Financial Cooperation, from This 
Day (This Day, 2013B), two Nigerian government representatives, the President and a 
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minister (or Special Adviser to the President as he is titled in this article), are quoted. 
Whereas the President is coded with a 1 on positive on the relation, the minister is 
also, indirectly, quoted concerning the relationship, but here we have chosen not to 
code it, since the quote does not contain any obvious bias: 
 
The agreements, according to a statement by the Special Adviser to the President on 
Media and Publicity, Dr Reuben Abati, which were signed, after bilateral talks between 
the two leaders and their delegations, include the Framework Agreement 
on Comprehensive Financial Cooperation In Support of Nigeria’s Economic 
Development and a Preferential Buyer Credit Agreement for Nigeria’s Four Airports 
Expansion Project (This Day, 2013B). 
 
One could argue that the indirect quote contains a slight positive bias due to the name 
of one of the agreements indicating support for Nigeria’s economic development. 
However, since this is a name that the source mentions, it does not qualify as a 
positive perception on the relation. Thus, this is an example of where doubt results in 
no coding as explained earlier in the chapter. The quote has therefore not been coded, 
since we assess it as containing no weighted words or phrases. 
 
2.3. Analytical limitations: pitfalls in our research design 
In this methodological subchapter, we will explain which limitations that are evident 
in our research design, thus also addressing which conclusions we can draw on behalf 
of these shortcomings. 
 
Our research design is characterized by some certain limitations, which we up until 
now only indirectly have touched upon, but we are well aware that some specific 
elements of this paper only can remain within the domain of speculation. Two 
elements in particular stand out in respect to our limitations: (1) a causation between a 
positive Nigerian public perception of the Chinese and the hard power elements at 
play in the Sino-Nigerian relationship, and related (2) causation between the media’s 
portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship and said positive public perception. 
Even though we have included several (and many different in style) surveys in our 
analysis, all highlighting a positive public perception towards the Chinese, our 
research design is not able to directly create a linkage between this perception and the 
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hard power facets of the Sino-Nigerian partnership. We mainly use the polls at our 
disposal to portray that the Nigerians might be attracted towards the Chinese South-
South cooperation strategy, where they provide an alternative6 development model of 
economic transformation, and related their aid model of ‘no-strings-attached’. This 
causation that a positive Chinese perception in Nigeria is directly related to ‘the 
Chinese model’ is not thoroughly demonstrated in our paper. If this had been the main 
task of our paper, we would have to have made a comprehensive evaluation of all the 
intervening variables that could have caused this positive perception, and then lastly 
assessed which factor that actually / most likely has generated this outcome. The 
subject of culture, which we touched upon earlier, could for example have played an 
important role in this respect, where Chinese foreigners in Nigeria could have 
influenced the local Nigerian population, as to explaining why they have a positive 
perception towards them.  
Our inclusion of the Nigerian media in this paper is to be interpreted in this regard, 
where we have realized that our research design most optimally can seek for an 
approximate evaluation of correlation. Focusing on the potential correlation we 
already had created (positive perception and the Chinese model), we sought to further 
strengthen this assumption. Simply stating that the positive Nigerian public perception 
is due to the attraction of the Chinese model, holds little validity, why the media’s 
portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship might highlight this unknown linkage. 
As we argued earlier, the Nigerian media’s portrayal of the Chinese can have 
shaped the Nigerian public’s perception of the Chinese. If the Nigerian media portrays 
the Chinese partnership positively, or simply act as a mouthpiece for the two 
governments, then they can have generated a certain discourse and consequently have 
had influence upon the Nigerian public. Our broad analysis of the Nigerian media in 
2013 seeks to investigate this notion. 
Related, we seek through our media analysis to depict that the media’s coverage of 
the Sino-Nigerian state-to-state relations makes the positive rhetoric on the subject of 
soft power value in itself. If we continuously witness that the Nigerian media has a 
positive attitude towards the economic gains being made in the Chinese partnership, 
the very fact that China and Nigeria are involved becomes a value of soft power. This 
research strategy falls into a similar category of pitfalls that we highlighted above, 
                                                
6 Alternative to the traditional Washington Consensus/donor-client relationship that the Western donors 
provide, this will further be deliberated upon in the analysis. 
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where unknown correlation becomes an issue. Our argument in this regard is that we 
simply wish to reveal how state-to-state relationships can become a symbol of soft 
power value, and that if the Nigerian public is receptive towards the media’s 
portrayal, then it is very likely that the state-to-state relations have become a source of 
soft power in themselves. 
Even though we have various flaws in our research methods, we do achieve in 
conducting an examination of how public perception potentially can correlate to the 
hard power facets in the Sino-Nigerian relationship, and this is no small contribution 
to be neglected. After all, we do have various limitations to what we are able to 
achieve, taking into consideration that we (1) cannot physically conduct our research 
in Nigeria7, (2) our empirical sources are limited, and we must rely on what is already 
out there, and (3) limitations in terms of paginal space and time to conduct our 
research.  
We feel that this paper demonstrates an understanding of how soft and hard power 
can be interconnected, and which elements one must consider in this respect. 
Furthermore, a self-awareness on which limitations our research design attains is not 
to be solely interpreted as a flaw, but also a challenge for further research on the 
subject.  
                                                
7 If we had been able to conduct surveys on our specific subject in Nigeria, we would with greater ease 
been able to steer around the factor of unknown correlation. For example, asking Nigerians whether 
they felt attracted towards the Chinese economic model.  
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3. Theory 
This chapter will present the theoretical backdrop to our research area, where the 
different aspects offered in this section will directly or indirectly be utilized as 
reference points and thus play a recurring role throughout the paper. This chapter 
consists of three sub-sections: (1) a general overview on the different faces of power, 
(2) a section on soft power, and (3) a section consisting of discussions on the interplay 
between soft and hard power. Our operationalization and the purpose of these sections 
will be stated in an ongoing fashion. 
 
3.1. Three faces of power 
This theoretical subchapter will provide the reader an insight into the theoretical 
debate on power, which in contemporary time saw its first spark in 1957 with Robert 
A. Dahl’s article The Concept of Power (Dahl, The Concept of Power, 1957), and 
which was later kindled by his book Who Governs?, published in 1961 (Dahl, 2005). 
Dahl’s notion of power and the later reconceptualizations made during the debate 
are inevitable when discussing power, and will serve as an essential backdrop to 
Joseph Nye’s soft power. Thus, this subchapter will provide a theoretical frame for 
the paper, and the three faces of power will therefore not be directly operationalized 
within the analysis. 
 
According to Robert Dahl (1957), power is the ability of actor A to get actor B to do 
something that B would not otherwise have done. This notion still plays a pivotal role 
in the scientific as well as the public notion of power, and thus will serve as basic 
understanding of power for the reader. This is the first face of power8. 
Dahl defines power as a relation between actors, be it individuals, groups, 
governments, nation-states etc. It is this relation between actors that is expressed in 
the abovementioned notion of A exerting power over B and places the focus on the 
behavior of individuals within the decision-making process. 
When Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (1962) contested Dahl’s theory of 
power, they did not reject his basic notion of A’s exertion of power over B, but 
                                                
8 The term was not originally used by Dahl, but introduced by Bachrach & Baratz in 1962, when they 
introduced the second face of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). We have chosen to use these terms, 
and to avoid confusion we therefore will also use the term third face of power when speaking of Lukes’ 
three dimensional view, as he himself dubs it. 
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criticized his narrow focus on the decision-making process. They therefore included 
agenda setting as a form of power. This second face of power is expressed when A 
uses power to keep a certain issue away from the decision-making process (non-
decisions). The second face of power, however, maintains Dahl’s focus on conflicts, 
and this is where the third face of power comes in. 
The third face of power or, as Steven Lukes (2005) himself coined it, the three-
dimensional view was introduced in order to widen the focus to include the hidden 
factors of power. In the eyes of Lukes, both Dahl and Bachrach & Baratz narrow their 
identification of power to conflicts only, “But this is to ignore the crucial point that 
the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising 
in the first place” (Lukes, 2005, s. 27). Lukes thus widened the focus to include the 
latent conflict and the distinction between subjective and real interests, since power in 
his view could be used to shape the minds of others and thus avoiding the conflict. 
With the three faces of power in mind, we will now proceed to the core of the 
theoretical chapter, namely Joseph Nye’s term of soft power. 
 
3.2. Joseph Nye: soft power 
Joseph Nye’s term of soft power provides the core of our theoretical investigation in 
this paper, and will be applied to the case of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. The main 
purpose of this application is to provide insight of this specific case through a 
theoretical lens, which in turn should further help determine and broaden the 
understanding of this relationship9. 
 
3.2.1. Resources of power 
An important distinction being made within the literature on power is the 
conceptualization of power as either a means or an ends: is power a tool we can wield 
or is it something we intend to achieve? This distinction portrays itself within the 
academic field of International Relations (IR), when resources or outcomes become 
determinant of the power debate. We will further elaborate upon this issue of 
distinction, but firstly we wish to present the different understandings of resources 
that reside between the hard power view and the soft power view. 
                                                
9 This point will further be elaborated upon in our chapter of Methodology. 
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We generally tend to view power as a resource within the IR field, and the 
traditional understanding of power was mostly centered on its hard power potential. 
The realist perspective, stressing the hard-power resources as determinants in world 
politics, is a view advocated by scholars like John J. Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, 
and Hans Morgenthau. Power resources, according to these scholars, are based upon 
tangible assets, most notably through military power, though economic prowess is an 
important factor herein. It is the guns, the brawn and the sticks that will determine 
particular outcomes, and the economic might of a nation can in turn produce these 
resources (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). Carrots, on the other hand, also play an 
important role within this power spectrum, in that alliance formation can turn the tides 
of war. For instance, by seducing your allies with economic gains, you can build your 
hard power capabilities (Walt, 1985)10. Power is very visible in this sense and mainly 
refers to Dahl’s first face of power. 
The soft-power resources, as we mentioned in the introduction, consist of 
intangible assets, and in their most basic form include foreign policies, values and 
culture. Culture includes both high culture and popular culture, while the promotion 
of peace and human rights are examples of foreign policies that can be soft-power 
resources (Nye, 2004, s. 11-13). Nye specifies that soft-power resources also include 
intangible factors such as institutions, ideas, and the perceived legitimacy of policies 
(Nye, 2011, s. 21). ‘Ideas’ are an example of the soft power resource of values, and 
Nye also argues that a wide variety of basic resources can be converted into soft 
power – for example “a positive domestic model, a successful economy, and a 
competent military” (Nye, 2011, s. 99). 
 
3.2.2. Power 
In order to illuminate Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power, we find it relevant to begin 
by introducing some of his thoughts on power in more general terms. This paragraph 
will provide such an introduction. 
 
                                                
10 More on the realist perspective and the hard power view will continuously be elaborated upon in this 
paper, but in this particular section we only wish to highlight the resources they consider important. 
The section on Gallarotti: meta-power and the realists will take a broader structural view on the 
realists into consideration. 
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Nye argues that power is “elusive and difficult to measure” (Nye, 2011, s. 3), and he 
argues that it is impossible to develop a single index of power because it “depends 
upon human relationships that vary in different contexts” (Nye, 2011, s. 5).  
While Nye finds power resources important, he still argues that having them does 
not guarantee getting the outcomes that one wants, and that “Power conversion – 
getting from resources to behavioral outcomes – is a crucial intervening variable 
(Nye, 2011, s. 8). He further argues that the successful combination of hard and soft-
power resources in different contexts is the key to what he terms smart power (Nye, 
2011, s. 10). 
Nye refers to Steven Lukes’ three faces of power, as he argues that it is necessary 
to focus on both individual actors – the main focus of the first face – and the structural 
forces (such as culture, social relations, and power) that constrain them – the main 
focus of the second and third faces – in order to describe power relationships fully. In 
this way he argues that his approach allows some consideration of structural forces, 
even though some have criticized him for being too agent centered11. 
Nye distinguishes command power, which he relates to the first face of power, 
from co-optive power, which is more subtle and less visible and thus related to the 
second and third faces of power (Nye, 2011, s. 13-16). Relating to the full spectrum of 
power behavior, Nye also criticizes the approach of Realism for conceiving power too 
narrowly because “states are no longer the only important actors in global affairs; 
security is not the only major outcome that they seek, and force is not the only or 
always the best instrument available to achieve those outcomes” (Nye, 2011, s. 19). 
It is in the context of this general notion of power that Nye places soft power, 
which we will examine in the next section. 
 
3.2.3. Soft power  
“It is not smart to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations, 
and ephemeral popularity (…) it is a form of power – a means of obtaining desired 
outcomes” (Nye, 2004, s. 129). 
While we touched briefly upon Nye’s basic definition of soft power in the 
introduction, we will here introduce some of his further considerations regarding the 
concept. One of the things that we briefly mentioned in the introduction is the 
                                                
11 Read section on Gallarotti: meta-power and the realists for an insight to this critique of agent-based 
power. 
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distinction between hard and soft power and the interplay between the two types of 
power. In this section we will first be looking at some of the major differences 
between hard and soft power, then turn to some of the ways that the two types of 
power overlap and have influence on each other, and finally we will look at the 
distinction between soft-power resources and soft power behavior. Delving into these 
areas will be important for us in order to be able to apply the concept of soft power on 
our case study in an accurate manner. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Nye views soft power as the ability to shape the 
preferences of others (through the resources of culture, political values, and foreign 
policy), and achieving one’s desired outcomes without using threats or inducements. 
Thus, the difference between achieving certain outcomes with or without the use of 
threats and inducements (or sticks and carrots) constitutes one of the major 
differences between hard and soft power, in Nye’s opinion. 
Nye argues that these hard power political tools are costly, and that a country will 
not need to use as many of them, if it encounters little resistance to its wishes and 
others willingly follow it because it has an attractive culture and ideology, or because 
it makes its actions and power legitimate in the eyes of others by shaping, using, and 
following international rules and institutions (Nye, 2004, s. 10-11). Thus, a country’s 
soft power depends to a high degree upon how citizens in other countries perceive the 
country in question, which goes in line with one of Nye’s arguments, that a difference 
between hard and soft power is that “soft power depends more than hard power upon 
the existence of willing interpreters and receivers” (Nye, 2004, s. 16). 
As these interpreters and receivers, the targets of soft power, live in different 
places, a country’s soft power will not necessarily be the same in different places of 
the world, and Nye argues that one thing can attract some while it repels others (Nye, 
2011, s. 92). The dependence on the targets also makes the wielding of soft power 
more difficult in comparison with the use of economic and military power, which, 
according to Nye, are often straightforward12 matters (Nye, 2004, s. 99). At the same 
time, he argues that soft-power resources are “generally slower, more diffuse and 
more cumbersome to wield than hard-power resources”, and furthermore that many 
of the crucial resources of soft power are outside governmental control (Nye, 2004, s. 
                                                
12 Nye’s own word choice.  
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99-100). Here he for instance refers to the fact that civil society is the origin of much 
soft power (Nye, 2004, s. 17) and also to popular culture, which is not under the direct 
control of government, and which does not always produce the policy outcomes that 
governments might desire (Nye, 2004, s. 52). As we already mentioned, public 
perception will play a central role in this paper, using it to illuminate soft power in the 
Sino-Nigerian relationship. 
Also related to governments’ lack of control over soft-power resources is the fact 
that “soft power depends upon credibility” (Nye, 2011, s. 83), because governments 
not only compete with other governments for this credibility, but also with “news 
media, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations, and networks of scientific communities” (Nye, 2004, s. 106), and thus, 
soft power depends upon several different actors, and not exclusively upon 
governments. With this in mind, we have chosen to more specifically target the news 
media in Nigeria, seeking to understand which soft power credibility they portray of 
the Chinese. Interrelated with this competition for credibility, Nye argues that 
”Narratives become the currency of soft power” (Nye, 2011, s. 104), and this is 
something that we will get back to in our analysis, when we look at the Nigerian 
media’s discourse on the Sino-Nigerian relationship. 
From Nye’s perspective, soft power is not only more difficult to use than hard 
power – it is at times also difficult to distinguish from hard power. For example, Nye 
argues that having a strong economy, which is a tangible asset normally seen as a 
hard power resource, also contributes to the reputation and attractiveness of a country 
(Nye, 2004, s. 33). He further argues that economic resources can produce both soft 
and hard power behavior because a successful economic model can be converted into 
military resources, “but it can also attract others to emulate its example” (Nye, 2011, 
s. 52), and for instance China’s soft power today is enhanced by the success of its 
economic model (Nye, 2011, s. 52). Thus, economic resources can attract as well as 
coerce, and this overlap can make it difficult to distinguish between what is hard and 
what is soft power in an economic relationship (Nye, 2011, s. 85). This point in 
argument will be assessed in the analysis, when we seek to investigate whether the 
Nigerians are attracted towards the Chinese economic model. 
In summary, hard-power resources can be used for soft power goals, and likewise 
soft power can have important effects on the hard power situation. Now let us turn to 
the use of power, and how Nye describes interactions of power. 
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Nye touches upon how countries can be effective in their soft power utilization and 
he refers in this regard to three clusters of qualities, drawing on the work of 
Alexander Vuving, whose works deal with attraction at the state level. 
The first of these clusters is benignity, which refers to that “being perceived as 
benign tends to generate sympathy, trust, credibility, and acquiescence” (Nye, 2011, 
s. 92).  
The second cluster is competence, which “refers to how an agent does things, and 
it produces admiration, respect, and emulation through its actions” (Nye, 2011, s. 92) 
(like the example of China’s successful economic model). 
The third cluster of charisma is “an aspect of an agent’s relation to ideals, values, 
and vision, and it tends to produce inspiration and adherence” (Nye, 2011, s. 92). 
According to Nye, “these clusters of qualities are crucial for converting resources 
(such as culture, values, and policies) into power behavior” (Nye, 2011, s. 92), and he 
argues that it is a critical ability to create perceptions of these three qualities in the 
target in order to convert soft-power resources into outcomes (Nye, 2011, s. 100).  
What has become clear here is that Nye distinguishes the (re)sources of soft power 
– culture, political values, and foreign policy – from soft power behavior, which he 
identifies as the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by affecting others “by framing 
the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction” (Nye, 2011, s. 20-21). 
Affecting others can be done in different ways, and Nye distinguishes between an 
active and a passive approach to soft power. The active approach is to make an effort 
to create attraction through for example public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchanges, 
and assistance, while the passive approach is to cause attraction through being an 
example for others to follow (Nye, 2011, s. 94). Yet another distinction is between the 
two models of direct and indirect soft power. The direct form of soft power refers to 
the attraction and persuasion, which happens on the level of leaders, while the indirect 
form “is a two-step model in which publics and third parties are influenced, and they 
in turn affect the leaders of other countries” (Nye, 2011, s. 94). We will look at both 
forms in our analysis, analyzing both the state-to-state interaction between Nigeria 
and China, and investigating Nigerian public perception of the Chinese.  
Interestingly, Nye notes that soft power need not be a zero-sum game, where the 
soft power increase of one country entails the decrease of another country’s soft 
power (Nye, 2011, s. 90). Thus, two countries can share a high level of soft power in 
a specific country. This is to be kept in mind by the reader, because our analysis of 
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public perceptions of the Chinese in Nigeria will be paralleled with views on the US, 
seeking to gain context for our surveys. 
To sum up, in this section we have introduced Nye’s way of distinguishing 
between hard and soft power – which has included looking at the use of threats and 
inducements, soft power’s dependence on receivers, and the difficulty in wielding it. 
Furthermore, we have shown where Nye identifies overlaps between hard and soft 
power and the reciprocal effects of the two types of power on each other. All of this 
will be relevant to the interconnectedness between hard and soft power. Laying forth 
these basic understandings (e.g. clusters, the distinction between resources and 
behavior, and the interconnectedness between hard and soft power) of Nye’s soft 
power view will help in operationalizing with the term, in the forthcoming chapter of 
Analysis. 
 In the following section we will turn to look more at the usefulness of soft power 
and further elaborate on its interconnectedness with hard power by introducing some 
academic discussions on the concept. 
 
3.3. Academic discussions on soft power 
The paper has now provided the theoretical terms of the three faces of power and soft 
power by Joseph Nye. This theoretical subchapter will now broaden the picture by 
presenting some of the dominating discussions on soft power relating to the 
discussion of soft power in relation to hard power. These discussions will allow us to 
nuance the term of soft power, which we will do in further detail and in relation to our 
specific case in the chapter of discussion.  
 
3.3.1. Mingjiang Li: a soft use of power 
According to Kurlantzick, who has participated with a chapter in the book, Soft 
Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics, edited by Mingjiang Li, 
Chinese scholars have already broadened the soft power term to include all power 
resources other than military power – including for instance economic measures like 
aid and investment (Kurlantzick, China's Soft Power in Africa, 2009, s. 167). This 
paragraph will provide an insight into this broadening of the definition of soft power 
by presenting Li’s attempt of redefining soft power. 
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Just as Nye’s soft power term must be viewed in the light of the US, Mingjiang Li’s 
reconceptualization must be viewed in the light of China, since the 
reconceptualization stems from the inability of the existing framework to explain 
China’s growth of soft power: 
 
The growth of China’s soft power can hardly be explained by the existing theoretical 
framework – the global profile of China’s culture, ideology, values, and ability to shape 
international institutions simply has not increased enough (Li, 2009, s. 9). 
 
Li uses the argument put forward by Fareed Zakaria that “China has used soft 
power only in the sense that it has exercised its power softly” (Li, 2009, s. 2) to build 
his reconceptualization of soft power. Li argues that soft power should not be defined 
through certain sources of power, but rather through how the resources of power are 
used (Li, 2009, s. 7).  
He uses an example that is relevant to our scope of analysis, when asking whether 
the economic aid provided by Country A to Country B is in fact a case of soft or hard 
power (Li, 2009, s. 3-4). It is on this basis that Li poses the question why soft power 
is limited to the resources of culture, ideologies, and values, when other – more 
tangible – resources can also work as attraction (Li, 2009, s. 4). This leads him to 
suggesting that the “traditional sources of hard power can also be sources of soft 
power” if used softly – for instance through humanitarian aid or peacekeeping 
missions (Li, 2009, s. 5). This behavioral approach of soft power, according to Li, 
thus serves a better way of understanding soft power, since it focuses not on the 
resources of power, but how these are used. Li deems it a soft use of power (Li, 2009, 
s. 7). 
Li’s conceptual understanding of soft power will be operationalized with in the 
discussion, when we further discuss the use of power and how we in our analytical 
approach have sought to devise a design based on use, rather than looking at sources 
alone. 
 
3.3.2. Craig Hayden: the question of causality 
As seen earlier, Joseph Nye views soft power as a means of obtaining desired 
outcomes through the conversion of soft-power resources. While Mingjiang Li has 
dealt with soft power’s relationship with hard power in suggesting a notion of a soft 
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use of power that can include using economic resources, Craig Hayden rather places 
the focus on the variety of soft power notions and on the causality in the conversion 
of soft-power resources into outcomes. 
 
In Hayden’s view, Nye’s notion of soft power has grown beyond its domestic origins 
(Hayden, 2012, s. 35), and thus the concept has become a “malleable signifier of 
political action” and not a fixed term, and he argues that the concept has become a 
“catch-all term13 to describe how nation-states engage the global political landscape” 
to achieve objectives in the face of newly emergent challenges to the traditional 
means of power politics (Hayden, 2012, s. 4-6). In line with this, he argues that there 
is considerable latitude in how soft power is interpreted and deployed around the 
world (Hayden, 2012, s. 7), and he further argues that the concept is “difficult to 
deploy in an analytically consistent fashion. Nye’s concept requires further 
specification of its vehicles, its relationships, and its context” (Hayden, 2012, s. 28). 
Hayden contends that it remains to be more fully explained how the intangible 
resources of soft power can lead to co-option because it is difficult to know just what 
things incentivize action, which means that Nye’s notion of soft power does not 
capture how resources are translated into policy outcomes (Hayden, 2012, s. 34-35). 
According to Hayden, this problem stems from a lack of clarity on the causality 
concerning the soft power concept, because 
 
No singular resource has an inherent soft power quality across contexts, nor, do 
behavioral outcomes (like co-option) appear as distinctly the result of an action, direct 
exposure to a resource, or as the result of a structural relation (Hayden, 2012, s. 34). 
 
With Hayden’s assessment of Nye’s conceptualization in mind, it seems that soft 
power is important to actors in international politics, but it is still unclear how it 
works exactly, and thus its analytical usefulness might be enhanced with a further 
clarification of how a country can convert its soft-power resources into outcomes and 
of the causality between the deployment of soft power and outcomes. 
Hayden’s argument will be relevant in this paper, as we will argue that it is 
difficult to identify an exact causality between certain parts of the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship and the Nigerian perceptions of China. Though, in the chapter of 
                                                
13 Meaning an all-encompassing term that is easily applied. 
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Discussion we will more specifically operationalize with Hayden’s work, debating 
whether causality can be found between resources and outcomes – this in relation to 
one of the pitfalls in our research design14.  
 
3.3.3. Giulio Gallarotti: meta-power and the realists 
The paper Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions Under 
Which it Can Be Effectively Used by Giulio Gallarotti (2011) provides great insight to 
the soft power notion’s relation to hard power, and how the two are much intertwined. 
Gallarotti’s analysis of hard vs. soft power does not deviate much from the views of 
Nye, but it is structured differently, relying on a broader debate about power 
(Gallarotti, 2011, s. 24-28). 
Gallarotti places Nye’s soft power notion within the meta-power domain, 
classifying it thus neither as a structural nor actor-based power theory. Gallarotti 
quotes Peter Hall15 in this regard, in that meta-power relates to the aforementioned 
second and third faces of power, referencing soft power as a power notion, which 
explain “the shaping of social relations, structures, and situations between the actors 
themselves” (Gallarotti, 2011, s. 11). It is a complex overview where the actor-based 
power alone is not determinant of outcomes, but on the other hand the structural web 
between the actors is not in itself explanatory of power relations (Gallarotti, 2011, s. 
20). Actors can actively influence upon their soft power capabilities when they are 
viewed as resources, but on the other hand social relations between the nations and 
the structural elements of power can determine the outcome of an actor’s soft power 
decisions (Gallarotti, 2011, s. 11-13). One could interpret this as a response to the 
realist perspective, which in a higher degree views the soft power notion as something 
complementary to the debate about power, and not as a central element. 
Traditionally the realist perspective on power dimensions takes a structural 
standpoint. The inevitability of conflict is a structural default setting that our 
international order has created, since no authority stands above a nation’s own self-
interest. The usual term used in this sense is the anarchic world order, where 
safeguarding your own survival is a nation’s foremost objective16. The realist 
                                                
14 See section of limitations and pitfalls in our research design, chapter of Methodology.  
15 Hall, Peter M. 1997: Meta-Power, Social Organization, and the Shaping of Social Action, 
Symbolic Interaction 20:397–418. 
16 The realist perspective draws these traits from Thomas Hobbes’ State of Nature view, portrayed in 
the famous writing Leviathan. 
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perspective is thus mainly focused on the hard power capabilities of a country, 
because these assets will be determinant of the outcomes in an anarchic world society 
(Waltz, 1979, s. 131). The hard power term should consequently be interpreted and 
understood within this structural view of world politics, and the dimensions of power 
are thus of structural importance. This is not to say that actors do not play an 
important role in a hard power analysis, but ultimately a structural overview and 
reasoning is necessary when dealing with the facets of hard power alone. 
The soft power does not contribute much when working within the realist 
framework, but the question is whether Nye intends it to be placed in a structural 
setting. Taking Gallarotti’s portrayal of soft power into consideration, this does not 
seem to be the case. Not only is Nye working with a meta-power structure, where 
both structural and actor elements are determinant of outcomes, but the soft power 
term is entangled with the hard power notion, making the two hard to differentiate. 
Gallarotti’s specifications on soft power as an actor-based theory will be drawn into 
the chapter of discussion, providing a broad perspective to the debate on interaction 
between actors, as this point in argument will help legitimize that we have chosen our 
specific research design. 
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4. Analysis 
This chapter will outline the findings we have made throughout our research and 
theoretically assess them. As our research method contains large amounts of empirical 
evidence, the analytical chapter will be predominantly empirical, with the theoretical 
operationalization on the empirical evidence mainly apparent in the conclusions of the 
three analytical subchapters. 
The first analytical subchapter Hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship will assess the relationship between China and Nigeria in recent history 
looking at elements such as oil, trade, presidential visits between the two countries, 
the so-called South-South cooperation, and lastly conclude the subchapter by 
discussing the interconnectedness between hard and soft power in the relationship 
between China and Nigeria. This subchapter will make use of the polls and surveys in 
order to draw the full picture of Nigerian public perception of the Chinese. 
The subchapter Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to China will outline the 2013 visit by 
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan to China, followed by an assessment of 
opinion pieces on the matter. This assessment will seek to demonstrate how the 
debate in the media on the Sino-Nigerian relationship reflects the Nigerian public 
perceptions and how the debate might affect these perceptions through a certain 
discourse. Thus also showcasing how the debate, through the state-to-state 
relationship between the two nations, might have caused a Nigerian soft power 
attraction towards the Chinese. 
The subchapter The portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship, will go back to 
looking into the relationship as the first subchapter did, but this time through how this 
overall relationship is portrayed in the Nigerian media. By assessing how sources are 
used in Internet news articles from four Nigerian newspapers, we wish to outline how 
the relationship is portrayed. The conclusion will analyze and discuss how this certain 
portrayal may affect how the Nigerian population perceives China and thus how it 
may affect the soft power of China in Nigeria. 
 
4.1. Hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian relationship 
In this analytical subchapter we will mainly look at the Sino-Nigerian relationship in 
terms of which hard and/or soft power elements that are driving the partnership. The 
purpose of this section is to illustrate that whilst the factors of hard and soft power can 
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be interpreted as separate elements, they are also interconnected when analyzing the 
Sino-Nigerian case. By looking at the hard and soft power means first, we also 
achieve in providing a sort of overview of this relationship, which will serve as a 
navigational and guiding role throughout the analysis. The first section will take a 
more pragmatic and empirical approach, while the latter part of this analytical 
subchapter in a follow-up fashion will make use of the theoretical concepts regarding 
these elements of power. This analytical approach was chosen, because the 
interconnectedness between hard and soft power in the Sino-Nigerian case should be 
interpreted in a broad perspective and across the many sectors that define the 
relationship. We will argue that the Chinese strategy in Nigeria is one of unity, for 
which reason charting the dimensions of the partnership first and then 
operationalizing with the theoretical terms, was the optimal analytical method in our 
opinion. 
 
4.1.1 Oil in the Sino-Nigerian partnership 
In mapping out the Sino-Nigerian relationship, the importance of the Nigerian oil 
reserves are hard to neglect in one’s analysis, for which reason it will also serve as an 
analytical starting point. 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) data from 2011 
show that Nigeria, in a global perspective, holds the 11th largest oil reserve and stands 
second to Libya amongst African nations with the largest oil reserves (Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2011). 37.2 billion barrels of oil are proven to 
exist within Nigerian territory, much of it located underwater in the Niger Delta (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2012). 
Nigeria has become a serious exporter of oil and reached a peak output of 2.63 
million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2005, 33% of which were exported to the US. 
Europe and the US import combined 61% of Nigerian crude oil exports, whilst India 
(12%) and Brazil (8%) also play a large role for the Nigerian oil sector. China is still a 
small player in comparison to these percentages and accounts for less than 5% of 
Nigerian oil exports (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012). At Nigeria’s 
period of peak production in 2005 approximately 50,000 barrels of oil were being 
exported to China daily (Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008), numbers that have dwindled 
since and are placed around 20,000 bbl/d anno 2013 (Kashi, 2013). Though according 
to Agence-France Presse, a tenfold development is to take place within the next years, 
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and already by 2015 China is to import 200,000 bbl/d from Nigeria, shifting the 
picture of Nigerian oil exports (Kashi, 2013). In comparison, the US, the biggest 
importer of Nigerian oil was by 2011 importing 767,000 bbl/d of Nigerian crude oil. 
The Nigerian oil reserves play an important role in Nigerian foreign policy 
(Babarinde & Wright, 2012), making it the regional sociopolitical giant it is today 
(Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 272). Mass wealth is being generated in this sector 
and foreign attraction to Nigeria is generated from the oil industry (Babarinde & 
Wright, 2012). Historically the oil industry in Nigeria has been tied to Western oil 
companies; Shell-BP made the first discovery of oil in the Niger Delta in 1956, but 
other Western conglomerates like Agip, Chevron and ExxonMobil have been 
extracting oil in the Niger Delta since the 1970’s (NNPC - Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, 2010). China is a relatively new player in the Nigerian oil 
sector, and getting a foothold in the sector itself is no small feat, since it is driven by 
high political connections17. 
On a domestic front, Chinese energy reserves have been in short supply to service 
the country’s exponential economic growth. Domestic Chinese oil supplies have been 
insufficient to service the increasing manufacturing capabilities and transportation 
needs that the Chinese economy is demanding to withstand a 9% growth-rate per year 
(Lee & Shalmon, 2008, s. 110). “Between 2000 and 2006, China’s oil consumption 
increased from 4.7 million bbl/d to almost 7.4 million bbl/d, 47 percent of which was 
derived from imports” (Lee & Shalmon, 2008, s. 110). 
Recent figures show that China is consuming 9 million bbl/d (2010) (BP British 
Petroleum, 2011, s. 11), and by 2030 it is estimated that they will import 10.9 million 
bbl/d, meaning that China will be importing 77% of their crude oil domestic demands 
(Lee & Shalmon, 2008, s. 110). To counter this trend of short oil supply, to avoid 
becoming dependent on its Middle Eastern oil exporters, and not having to compete 
with well-established International Oil Companies (IOC), China is on a quest to 
diversify the sources of its oil imports (Oliviera, 2009, s. 88), where Henry Lee and 
Dan Shalmon, authors of the chapter Searching for Oil: China’s Strategies in Africa, 
in Robert Rotbergs book China into Africa: Trade, aid and influence, highlight three 
traits that are characterizing the Chinese global oil strategy: 
 
                                                
17 The government seizes control over the oil reserves, because they are national territory and not 
privately owned. 
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- Differentiate Chinese initiatives from those offered by the Western governments and 
their oil companies. 
- Leverage China’s comparative advantages while downplaying its disadvantages. 
- Focus on those countries in which there was a high probability that oil reserves would 
grow and where China could negotiate arrangements that catered to its long-term 
interests.  
(Lee & Shalmon, 2008, s. 11) 
 
The Chinese influx of interest in Nigerian oil reserves should be interpreted in this 
light, where China seeks to diversify its oil sources to withhold its economic growth 
rates (Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008). This evolution sparks a series of questions that 
stand relevant to this paper’s research question; most centrally: (1) how is China 
gaining foothold in the Nigerian oil sector that has long historical ties with Western 
companies? And related, (2) why is the Nigerian government interested in expanding 
its partnership with China18? 
Starting with the former question, the importance of state-to-state partnership is 
hard to sideline in this perspective. Even though the oil industry in Nigeria has been 
mostly driven by IOCs, certain state interests have always taken centerfold in 
developing these partnerships. For instance, the second and third largest IOCs in 
Nigeria, ExxonMobil and Chevron, supply nearly 10% of American total crude oil 
imports 19  (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012). Likewise, Chinese 
National Oil Companies (NOC) have been sent on a global mission by the Chinese 
government to capture oil reserves, secure future sources of stabile oil imports, and 
thus ‘lock down’ oil partnerships between nations (Oliviera, 2009, s. 84-89). 
Lacking international competitiveness has been a characterizing trait of the NOCs 
for the past decades, with their structural institutional behaviors having been closely 
tied to the Chinese governance measures. The NOCs have for instance been known to 
make commitments to projects that would not withstand commercial value, but have 
played important political roles (Oliviera, 2009, s. 87). The NOCs do have an 
advantage, though, in the global oil industry, which for one is heavily reliant on big 
financing schemes for future projects and secondly involves great financing risks (e.g. 
discovery drilling, technological upgrades, etc.). Although the NOCs are conceived as 
                                                
18 The latter follow-up section will provide an insight to this question.  
19 Figures from 2011. 
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private functions, they still rely on cheap Chinese state sponsored loans to execute 
their business (Lee & Shalmon, 2008, s. 114; Oliviera, 2009, s. 84-86). 
One of the main Chinese NOCs involved in overseas business is the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC or CNOON), which has been very active 
in the Niger Delta for the past seven years. In early 2006 CNOOC bought a 45% stake 
in an offshore oilfield in Nigeria for the price of 2.27 billion USD (Obiorah, Kew, & 
Tanko, 2008, s. 278), and a license to explore for oil in another of the Niger Delta’s 
offshore oil blocks (NNPC: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 2006; Obiorah, 
Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 278). 
The Chinese government has played a pro-active role in fostering this partnership 
between the NOCs and the Nigerian government. In 2006, then Chinese President Hu 
Jintao visited Nigeria, where a benign contract was signed for the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The Chinese were given rights to explore in four 
Nigerian oil blocks, in exchange for a 4 billion USD Chinese commitment to invest in 
Nigerian infrastructural projects. The CNPC were granted at auction the first right of 
refusal20 in these blocks, where other IOCs also were contenders (BBC, 2006A; 
Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 278). 
Table 3 below shows, which deals the major NOCs; Sinopec, CNPC, CNOOC 
(dubbed CNOON in the table), have secured in the Niger Delta between 2006 and 
2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Rights to picking first in an oil block, which grants the most favorable oil pumping locations with 
most estimated barrels of oil. 
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Table 3 
 (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, s. 12) 
 
4.1.2. The Sino-Nigerian trade: Increasing Chinese exports 
The Chinese-Nigerian trade relations have, in crude numbers, increased from 2 billion 
USD in 2000 to 18 billion USD in 2010 (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, s. 3). In November 
2013, Project Manager of the Chinese companies at the Lagos International Trade 
Exhibition, David Zhao, remarked that recent numbers show that in the first half of 
2013, 6 billion USD accounted for the Sino-Nigerian trade relationship, and Nigeria 
has become China’s second largest export market in Africa, which the Chinese 
embassy in Nigeria also has announced (Embassy of the People's Republic of China 
in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013) (Vanguard, 2013B). 
However, a hefty trade imbalance has become apparent within this ten-year 
development, where Chinese exports to Nigeria in 2010 represented 87% of the 
bilateral trade (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, s. 6). The Chinese exports mainly consist of 
manufactured goods like machinery, telecom equipment, industrial equipment, 
textiles etc. whilst Nigerian exports to China mainly consist of crude oil. The Nigerian 
market, flooded with cheap Chinese goods, has been affected, as many Nigerian 
domestic companies have not been able to withhold competitiveness and as a result 
have shut down business (Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 279).  
 
 49 
4.1.3. The Chinese corporate presence in Nigeria  
Affected with most gravity has been the Nigerian textile industry, which employed 
nearly 1 million people in the 1980s with over 170 textiles factories located in the 
country (This Day, 2013C). In 2008 the number had dropped to six factories 
(Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 280), though in recent years factories have been re-
opening (This Day, 2013C). A survey performed by the Centre for Law and Social 
Action, Lagos, in 2007 and 2008 asked Nigerian traders which sort of influence the 
Chinese presence had upon them and their business (Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 
284-290). Three questions were asked and are displayed in cursive, while the 
responses are beneath each question, falling into different categorical responses. 
 
What sort of Impact Do You See The Chinese Having on Your Community? 
Positive: 14 
Negative: 0 
Neutral: 6 
 
What Business Sectors Do You See the Chinese Active in? 
Garments/fabrics: 17 
Electronics: 4 
Other: 2 
 
How Do You See the Chinese Community Developing over the Next Few years? 
Expanding: 17 
Diminishing: 0 
Stagnant/neutral: 4 
(Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 284-285) 
 
Seventeen of the twenty-three Nigerian respondents were involved in the garments 
industry, and it is interesting to note in this respect that even though the Chinese were 
expanding their business in this sector over the next few years, according to the 
respondents, they still had a positive perception on which impact the Chinese would 
have on their community (Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 284-87). Naturally, any 
conclusions on soft power will not derive from this poll alone, though it does provide 
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insight to which impact the Chinese textiles have had upon Nigerian businessmen and 
this is mainly a positive one towards the Chinese in Nigeria.  
Table 4 below provides an overview of the major Chinese firms in Nigeria, who 
are mainly involved in the oil sector, construction, and the telecom business. 
Furthermore, the table also highlights the revenues made by these Chinese companies 
in Nigeria, the biggest which have been made by Sinopec and CNPC in the oil and 
gas industry. CNPC’s success in Nigeria, as we argued earlier, is closely tied to the 
Chinese government’s political involvement in Nigeria. 
 
Table 4 
Source: (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, s. 10) 
 
4.1.3. Presidential visits and governmental cooperation between 
Nigeria and China 
Highly visible in the diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria stand the 
presidential visits that have been frequent between the two nations in recent years, 
where state-to-state meetings between the two have birthed concrete bilateral 
agreements. In 1999 and in 2001 then Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo visited 
China, and the China Trade Exhibition21 was held in late 2001 in Lagos22. Chinese 
manufacturers displayed everything from motorcycles to home appliances at this fair, 
which in part was sponsored by the China Chamber of International Commerce 
(Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 275). 
                                                
21 “The largest fair ever held in Africa by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
(CCPIT)” (Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 275). 
22 Nigeria’s largest city. 
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Obasanjo visited Beijing again in 2005, where meetings were held with top 
officials from the Chinese Communist Party, including then General Secretary of The 
Chinese Communist Party Hu Jintao and then Premier of China Wen Jiabao (FOCAC: 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 2005). The 2005 meeting resulted in a three set 
agreement plan to expand and promote the trade partnership between Nigeria and 
China: “(1) Investment cooperation, (2) Technical Cooperation, (3) Telecom 
development in Nigeria, with the assistance of Chinese company Huawei” (Obiorah, 
Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 276). 
2006 marked a big year in the Sino-Nigerian partnership, where several deals were 
sealed, consolidating economic ties between the two. Hu Jintao visited Nigeria in 
April, where a set of new agreements and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
were signed. A deal that yielded 
 
(1) A $500 million grant to support Nigerian infrastructural development, (2) 
Commitment to train Nigerian officials and medical personnel on malaria control, (3) 
Supply of antimalarial drugs, (4) Establishment on a cultural friendship project between 
the two nations, (5) Telecommunications infrastructural support, again with Huawei’s 
assistance, and (6) Support for the modernization project of the Nigerian railway system 
(Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 276). 
 
In junction with Jintao’s visit came the former mentioned drilling licenses that 
were granted to the Chinese, in exchange for a 4 billion USD investment in Nigerian 
infrastructure and oil projects. Later same year, Obasanjo granted the China Civil 
Engineering Construction Corporation an 8.3 billion USD contract to complete the 
latter mentioned railway modernization project. The contract was partially financed 
through a 2.5 billion USD concessional loan that the Chinese EximBank granted the 
Nigerian government (BBC, 2006B; Obiorah, Kew, & Tanko, 2008, s. 276). In the 
next subchapter, Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to China, we will return to the most recent 
example of a presidential visit between Nigeria and China and assess in more detail 
which kind of impact this visit had upon the Sino-Nigerian relationship. 
In a broader regional perspective the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) is a summit held with a three year interval to further develop and 
consolidate the Sino-African relations. The first meeting, held in year 2000, 
established the forum’s purpose to “strengthen friendly cooperation between China 
and Africa to meet the challenges of economic globalization and to seek common 
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development” (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 2013). At the 2006 
FOCAC event China pledged 100 billion USD by 2010 to its trade with Africa, more 
than doubling its 2005 pledge of 40 billion USD (Cooke, 2009, s. 29). At the most 
recent meeting, held in 2012, the Chinese pledged to commit 20 billion USD for the 
development of infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and development of small 
and medium-sized enterprises in Africa (FOCAC, 2012). The FOCAC meetings stand 
as a clear symbol of how the Chinese government seeks to create economic ties 
between African nations and China. 
Table 5 below shows some of the major agreements that have been made between 
the Nigerian and Chinese governments since 2001. The agreements vary in what they 
seek to achieve, but together they create a picture of Chinese and Nigerian political 
involvement, which not only are revolving around economic ties (e.g. The Agreement 
on Consular Affairs (2002), the Agreement on Tourism Co-operation (2002), 
Agreement of South-South Co-operation among China, Nigeria and FAO (2002), 
Memorandum of Understanding on peace co-operation (2010). 
 
Table 5 
Source: (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, s. 4) 
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4.1.4. South-South cooperation: A Chinese strategy of aid, tribute 
and economic desirability 
The bilateral agreements, the presidential visits and the increase of Chinese 
investments in the Nigerian oil sector are all part of a South-South cooperation23 
strategy that China has laid forth (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, s. 3). It is a broad 
encompassing strategy that joins the Chinese economic and diplomatic facets in their 
African relations. Beijing perceives the strategy as a win-win situation, where China 
gains economically, whilst the African nations are being developed in the process. An 
official Chinese White Paper was released in 2013, providing an overview of the 
Sino-African economic and trade cooperation. In its introduction it remarks that 
 
China has become Africa’s largest trade partner, and Africa is now China’s major 
import source, second largest overseas construction project contract market and fourth 
largest investment destination. China-Africa economic and trade development has 
improved people’s livelihoods and diversified economic development in African 
countries, provided strong support for China’s socio-economic development, and 
contributed to promoting South-South cooperation and balanced world economic 
development (The Information Office of the State Council, or China's Cabinet, 2013, s. 
1). 
 
The quote exemplifies the rhetoric on the South-South cooperation, and how the 
Chinese implicitly intend to portray the relationship as benign for the actors involved, 
thus using the rhetoric around economic gains as a soft power tool. Even though no 
official definition exists, the Beijing Consensus24 is a term widely used in this regard, 
which seeks to explain the alternative economic model of assistance that the Chinese 
can provide, contra the typical donor-client based relationship which has 
characterized the Western hemisphere’s assistance model to developing nations25 
                                                
23 A term describing the exchange of resources, technology and knowledge between developing 
nations, which is opposite to the rather traditional North-South relation, where exchanges are made 
between the already developed countries and developing countries. 
24 The term was first introduced by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former senior editor of Times Magazine, 
who brought forth the term in a Foreign Policy Paper he wrote for the United Kingdom’s Foreign 
Policy Centre. 
25 The Washington Consensus is a term used in this regard, first coined by John Williamson in the late 
1980s, describing a set of standard economic prescriptions that the IMF and the World Bank wielded as 
a reform package for bankrupt developing nations. The term has since become a symbol of the Western 
Hemisphere’s approach to economic transformation and hence also developmental aid in developing 
countries. 
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(Jian, 2008, s. 55). In this context the Beijing Consensus has also been used as a term 
describing that African nations seem to desire the economic model that China has 
used in their pursuit of economic growth: “Worldwide surveys have shown that most 
countries in the world, especially developing countries, see China’s economic rise as 
an opportunity rather than a threat” (Jian, 2008, s. 59; Cooke, 2009). 
Whilst the Chinese are using26 their economic model as a diplomatic and political 
tool in the developing world, they do provide traditional aid resembling the Western 
model. Though, the Chinese promote an aid strategy where ‘no strings are attached’, 
following back to the aforementioned Western aid model, where elements of good 
governance27 and democracy are conditions under which developing nations can 
receive aid (Cooke, 2009, s. 32). 
Official numbers have long been kept secret on Chinese aid to Africa, but in April 
2013 the Aiddata.org project started projecting and tracking Chinese aid in Africa 
between 2000 and 2011. According to their set of numbers, 73 billion USD28 were 
used as Chinese aid within this 11-year timespan (AidData, 2013). In comparison, the 
US, the biggest donor in terms of net bilateral disbursement, is averaging 8.2 billion 
USD each year in aid to the African continent (OECD, 2013, s. 4).  
Nigeria is the second largest receiver of official Chinese aid (Strange & al, 2013, s. 
34), and according to AidData’s numbers, official Chinese aid to Nigeria accounted 
for 11 billion USD between 2000 and 2011 (AidData, 2013, s. Nigeria). Deborah 
Brautigam, who has written extensively on the subject of Chinese aid in Africa, notes 
in her contribution to the book China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, that 
 
 China has used aid both as a form of exchange that resembles the ancient imperial 
practice of tribute, and a very modern expression of soft power: a tool of diplomacy and 
                                                
26 It is argued upon, whether the Chinese are actively wielding the Beijing Consensus and promoting 
their economic model. Some argue that the rhetoric alone around the subject is seeking to project this 
image, but there is no White Paper as of yet from the Chinese addressing this active use. 
27 The good governance strategy is wielded by donors and international institutions (e.g. The World 
Bank, IMF) alike, which typically implies a certain set of liberal economic policies (e.g. liberalizing 
labor markets, privatization) and improving on democratic measures (e.g. transparency, accountability, 
democracy). 
28 It should be noted in this regard, that varying definitions of aid exist in respect to what the term 
encompasses. The more traditional perception of aid in the West, doesn’t take military assistance into 
consideration for instance, whilst the Chinese and AidData include this aspect in their analysis. 
Furthermore AidData’s numbers are based upon official Chinese numbers (the few available), but also 
takes unofficial aid sources into consideration, like mega-projects that incorporate Chinese companies 
as well.  
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an instrument to meet political, strategic, and economic goals (Brautigam, 2008, s. 201-
202). 
 
We cannot truthfully know whether the Nigerians are in awe and desire of the 
Chinese economic model, or whether this factor is the main driver in determining 
what is moving this relationship forward. The increased political interaction on the 
state-to-state level might portray this image, but the public perception is also a factor 
that needs to be interpreted in this context, in that the public perception helps generate 
an important source of soft power. 
 
4.1.6. Nigerian public perception towards the Chinese 
The Pew Polls, conducted by The Pew Research Center, asked in 2007, 2010, and 
2013 what perception the Nigerians had towards the Chinese. The polls from 2007 are 
separate to the ones from 2010 and 2013, which have surveys that sometimes 
crossover. The 2007 polls show that Nigerians feel that China has great influence 
upon Nigeria (70%) (Poll 2007 – 1), that this influence is growing (63%) (Poll 2007 – 
2) and lastly that the Nigerians have a more positive view towards the Chinese than 
the Americans (positive views China: 79%, US: 58%) (Poll 2007 – 3). 
In 2010 and 2013 polls were conducted by The Pew Research Center, as to 
whether Nigerians regarded the Chinese as partners or as enemies, where the majority 
of the Nigerian respondents considered the Chinese as partners, rather than enemies 
(2010: 75%, 2013: 71%) (Poll 2010/2013 – 1). A poll conducted in 2013 portrayed 
that a majority of Nigerians felt that the Chinese were having a ‘great deal and a fair 
amount’ of influence on the way things were going in Nigeria (67%) (Poll 2013 – 1). 
A poll also conducted in 2013 asked whether the Chinese considered Nigerian 
interests, where a majority of the respondents felt that this was the case (70%) (Poll 
2013 - 2). A poll from both 2010 and 2013 shows that a majority of Nigerians have a 
positive and favorable view towards the Chinese (76%) (Poll 2010/2013 – 2). The last 
poll from 2013 shows that Nigerians rather would have close ties to China, in contrast 
to the US, though nearly a third of the respondents felt that ties with both nations at 
the same time were most important (US: 17%, both: 33%, China 37%) (Poll 2013 – 
3). The polls are shown below, corresponding to the order we have presented them in 
this paragraph. 
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Poll 2007 – 1 
 
Poll 2007 – 2 
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Poll 2007 – 3 
 
Source: (Cooke, 2009, s. 13-14) 
 
Poll 2010/2013 – 1 
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Poll 2013 – 1 
 
Poll 2013 – 2 
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Poll 2010/2013 – 2 
  
Source: (Pew Research Center, 2013E)29 (Pew Research Center, 2013C)30 (Pew 
Research Center, 2013A)31 (Pew Research Center, 2013B)32 
 
Poll 2013 – 3 
 
Source: (Pew Research Center, 2013D) 
                                                
29 “Full question wording: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China. Notes: Favorable combines "very favorable" and 
"somewhat favorable" responses. Unfavorable combines "very unfavorable" and "somewhat 
unfavorable."” 
30 “Full question wording: In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think China 
takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) - a great deal, a fair amount, not too 
much, or not at all? Notes: A great deal and a fair amount combined. Not too much and not at all 
combined. Not asked in China.” 
31 “Full question wording: How much influence do you think China is having on the way things are 
going in our country? Would you say it is having a great deal of influence, a fair amount, not too 
much, or no influence at all? Notes: A great deal and a fair amount combined. Not too much and no 
influence at all combined.” 
32 “Full question wording: Overall, do you think of China as more of a partner of (survey country), 
more of an enemy of (survey country), or neither?” 
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We cannot for sure determine whether these polls portray the image that the 
Nigerian public desires the Chinese economic model, but it is interesting to note that 
the Nigerians feel that the Chinese are partners rather than enemies, whilst the 
Chinese both have great influence upon how things are going in Nigeria and also take 
Nigerian interests into consideration. The general positive public perception towards 
the Chinese in Nigeria (76% of the respondents in both 2010 and in 2013 have 
favorable views towards the Chinese, and the generally positive perception that BBC 
World Service Poll notifies33) could indicate that Nigerians are attracted towards 
Chinese methods in relation to both aid and economic development. Further implying 
this point is the last poll shown above, where it is indicated that a majority of 
Nigerians feel that it is important to have ties to the Chinese (Poll 2013 – 3) rather 
than the Americans (37% of Nigerians lean towards the Chinese, whilst 17% of the 
respondents meant that ties with the Americans were more important). In extension, 
2007 poll – 2, portraying that the Nigerians rather would be influenced by the Chinese 
than the US, might similarly indicate that the Nigerians are more attracted towards the 
alternative Chinese economic model in contrast to the Washington Consensus (see 
footnote number 26 for definition). 
Soft power need not be a zero-sum game, as Nye remarks, where the soft power 
gains of China, means that American influence must decrease, but it is interesting to 
see how the Nigerians rather lean toward a Chinese partnership, and maybe this is to 
be interpreted in the light of their economic model of aid, where ‘no-strings are 
attached’. 
As we mentioned in the methodological chapter, we unfortunately cannot properly 
demonstrate causation between a positive Nigerian public perception of the Chinese 
and attraction towards the Chinese economic model, because we have not included all 
the intervening variables in our research design, and we have no direct polls 
concerning this specific subject. It is interesting to note, however, that the economic 
facets, as we depicted earlier in this analysis, seem to be the main drivers in pushing 
this relationship forward, why some correlation must be expected between the 
Nigerian positive perception and an attraction towards the Chinese economic model. 
If we for instance take the many infrastructural projects that the Chinese have assisted 
with in Nigeria into consideration, these might have created visibility of what the 
                                                
33 See chapter of Introduction for the BBC World Service Poll. 
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Chinese model stands for, and thus influencing the public perception in Nigeria. We 
will further deliberate upon these findings in the next section, where we will draw the 
many aspects, we up until now have presented in the analysis, into a broader 
deliberation upon how soft and hard power can be interconnected. 
 
4.1.5. Subconclusion: Hard or soft power at play in the Sino-
Nigerian relationship? 
The Sino-Nigerian relationship within the oil sector and in regards to the bilateral 
trade agreements can easily be interpreted as mere hard power interests from both 
country perspectives. Undeniably the partnership is a fruitful business for the Chinese, 
who seek to expand their oil sources, whilst exporting large numbers of differentiated 
goods to the Nigerian market. The Nigerian gains are somewhat less visible, but when 
you peek behind the curtains of the deals being brokered, the implications reach 
beyond single sector developments. An example of these multi-sectorial deals comes 
to show with the example of the oil explorations that the Chinese gained in 2006, but 
which ‘came at the price’ of developing Nigerian infrastructure and renewing the 
country’s railway system. Furthermore, the large amount of Chinese aid being 
channeled into Nigeria, seems to play an important role in this regard, but naturally 
we can only speculate whether Chinese aid has been determinant in the outcome of 
the deals made in the Sino-Nigerian relationship. Nonetheless, it is an interesting 
factor to keep in mind that the Nigerians are the second largest receivers of Chinese 
aid, while relations are intensifying between the two. The intensified political 
partnership and its ties to the economic gains being made certainly indicate that the 
Chinese partnership status must be interpreted within a larger domain, rather than 
economic opportunity alone. 
If we solely direct our analysis towards the economic facets of the partnership, 
Chinese carrots seem to be the main factors of what is driving the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship. Nye notes that soft power is expressed without using threats or 
inducements, but simply by shaping the preferences of others through political values 
or foreign policy, and at first glance, the aid and the bilateral agreements seem to 
display a use of inducements. Tangible outcomes characterize these deals, where the 
gains for both actors are very visible. 
But the analysis of the Sino-Nigerian relationship must be interpreted in a broader 
perspective. The economic development model that the Chinese provide is well 
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regarded, and the support they offer does not come at the price of rendering 
governance structures or implementing democracy, which has been characterizing the 
Western school of thought in regards to donor-client relations. If we for example look 
at the Chinese aid, it is not the aid itself that has become important in the Chinese 
model, but the conditions that they come under, namely that African partners are 
regarded as peers and that they stand as equals in the economic developmental 
positions (Cooke, 2009, s. 32)34. Typically in a power analysis, aid itself would be 
considered a hard power carrot, but in this case the values that the carrots represent 
can be devised as soft power means. 
Nye’s conceptualization on the use of soft power, through the three clusters 
benignity, competence, and charisma stand relevant in this respect, where the concept 
of competence seems especially visible if we assume that the Nigerians are in 
admiration of the Chinese economic model. Competence helps us understand how an 
economic facet of hard power can in turn become desirable, making it rather a source 
of soft power. The Chinese are exercising their economic growth model as a foreign 
policy that represents a certain set of values. Whether this is a passively or actively 
sought out technique is unknown, but if these values hold desirability by the 
Nigerians, they could in turn be used as a source of soft power. The example from the 
textiles industry could serve as an indicator in this respect, illustrating that even 
though the Chinese are ‘overtaking’ this domestic market, the Nigerians still have a 
positive view towards the Chinese. 
Again, unfortunately we can only speculate whether the Chinese economic model 
can be considered a soft power resource that is actively being used, and whether its 
desirability is something that Nigerians seek to achieve (this especially on a public-
citizen level), but the intensified and increasing Sino-Nigerian relationship seems to 
draw up this pattern, whilst the general positive perception of the Chinese in Nigeria 
also could correlate to this picture. The increased state-to-state relationship between 
the Chinese and Nigerians gives us some insight as to whether the Nigerian leaders 
are seeking to emulate the Chinese. The state-to-state relationship is very much a 
pivotal point for this relationship, and if we for example take the oil sector under 
inspection, it is quite apparent that the gains the NOCs have made in this sector are in 
                                                
34 See section on Pew Polls – one of the figures show that the Nigerians view the Chinese as partners. 
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large part due to the high-political play between the Nigerian and Chinese 
governments. 
In general, though, when regarding an economic relationship, it is difficult to 
distinguish whether an economic model is a source of soft power or a means of hard 
power, as Nye notes himself. If it is in fact the case that the Chinese are using a mix 
of hard and soft power in their Nigerian strategy, then they are cleverly wielding a 
smart power technique. 
Our assessment views the Chinese strategy as a symbiotic unit, because the multi-
dimensional characterization of the Chinese strategy in Nigeria seems to join the hard 
and soft-power resources into one strategy. Considering the wider aspects of the 
strategic partnership for instance meant that the China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation were able to be granted the deal of modernizing the Nigerian railway 
system on behalf of Jintao’s visit to Nigeria. The presidential visits draw the same 
pattern that the Chinese strategy is one of wielding both soft and hard power, and the 
role of the Chinese government has played an important role in sealing the many 
economic deals between the two countries. 
The many presidential visits between the Chinese and the Nigerians could play a 
central part in projecting soft power. The outcomes of the meetings have always 
generated hard-power resources (e.g. modernization of railways, influence in the oil 
sector), but the meetings themselves have created visibility for the public that China 
and Nigeria are cooperating and that this is a benign relationship for both parts. Thus, 
the successes in one section of the relationship should in our view be interpreted on 
behalf of the larger picture and in relation to the grand Chinese strategy. The Chinese 
gains in the Nigerian oil sector for example are most likely due to the increasing 
Chinese aid and the presidential visits as well, why hard and soft power assets become 
joined. We argue, though, that the most visible depiction of the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship must be the presidential visits between the two, and the Nigerian media’s 
portrayal of the relationship in general, why we in the following sections of this 
analysis will in greater depth analyze which impact these sources might have had 
upon the Nigerian public. 
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4.2. Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to China 
In this section we will look more closely into the four newspapers’ portrayal of the 
recent visit by Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, to China. Our reason for 
examining this visit is that it is a symbolic event of the state-to-state political and 
economic cooperation between Nigeria and China, as presidential visits are an arena 
where foreign policy is displayed and formulated. 
As Nye argues, foreign policy is a source of soft power, but additionally the debate 
in the newspapers in relation to the event can become a soft power value itself by 
providing positive narratives on the subject, and as the reader might remember, 
narratives are the currency of soft power. In relation to the article by Jennifer Milliken 
on discourse analysis, we will be looking into how the discourse in this debate gives 
meaning to the Sino-Nigerian relationship, and thus constructs it a social reality, and 
also how this discourse is operationalizing a ‘regime of truth’ about the relationship. 
 
4.2.1. Background 
From July 8 to July 12, 2013, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan led an entourage 
of 13 Nigerian Ministers, among others, on an official visit to China. One of the 
outcomes of the visit was that Jonathan and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, 
“presided over the signing of five agreements to boost financial, trade, economic, 
technical and cultural relations between Nigeria and China” (Vanguard, 2013A). 
Furthermore, Jonathan attended the Nigeria-China Business Forum, “which had over 
300 Chinese investors in attendance” (The Punch, 2013C). According to This Day, 
the Nigerian Government attracted over $25 billion in investment (This Day, 2013D), 
and all these facts suggest that the visit was highly important in relation to the state-
to-state political and economic relationship between the two countries. We will now 
move into analyzing how this visit was portrayed in opinion pieces in the four 
Nigerian newspapers, in order to illustrate how it has been perceived in Nigeria.  
 
4.2.2. Opinions 
Two articles by Odilim Basil Enwegbara, who writes regularly in the Business section 
of The Punch35, seem to be prime examples of articles, where China’s economic 
model affects its soft power in Nigeria. In both articles, named Jonathan’s timely visit 
                                                
35 As a search on the newspaper’s website shows. 
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to China and Jonathan’s timely visit to China (2), respectively, Enwegbara argues 
much in favor of seeking inspiration in the Chinese model of economic growth, while 
none of the articles, despite their titles, in fact deal very much with the actual 
presidential visit36. In the first article, Enwegbara mainly deals with China’s economic 
growth since 1978, and his admiration of the Chinese development model is for 
example evident as he mentions some of the major achievements of the Chinese 
economy over the last three decades, and then arguing: “In short, China has become 
so successful to have become, today, the world’s number one in virtually all good 
economic indicators”. Not only does he show considerable admiration for the Chinese 
economic model, he also argues that “China’s successful model makes a lot of sense 
for Nigeria, particularly learning from the former how long term macroeconomic 
planning coupled with the promotion of entrepreneurship could too become Nigeria’s 
own economic growth drivers” (The Punch, 2013D). 
While the first article compares the Chinese and American economies in some 
places, Enwegbara compares the two economies more in depth in his second article, 
calling the economic model of China Sinonomics and the American model 
Americanomics. Again he is very positive toward the Chinese model, referring to the 
endless phenomenal double-digit growth of the Sinonomics, while he argues 
 
that oligarchic Corporate America has cynically corrupted and co-opted state 
legislatures, governors, Congressmen and women, judges, newspaper editors, and 
presidents in ways that virtually all government economic decisions only promote the 
monopolistic agenda of the oligarchs (The Punch, 2013E). 
 
Consequently, he argues in favor of overhauling the Nigerian banking sector 
following the Chinese example (The Punch, 2013E). Enwegbara’s portrayal of China 
reflects a positive Nigerian perception of China as his narrative is highly praising its 
economic model, which relates to Nye’s argument that a country can gain soft power 
through having a successful economic model. Thus, we also see the 
interconnectedness between hard and soft power, as the hard power facet of a strong 
economy leads to soft power as presented here. 
                                                
36 We have included them in this section on the presidential visit because they, as their titles imply, are 
articles that were brought as background pieces in relation to the visit. 
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Yakubu Dati, who is accredited as the Coordinating General Manager, (Corporate 
Communications), Aviation Parastatals, has written the opinion piece Jonathan’s 
China visit: Implications for the aviation sector in The Guardian and The Punch. Dati 
argues that the visit in general produced “milestone technical agreements that would 
surely place Nigeria’s economy on the path of irreversible growth”, which indicates 
that he considers the economic relationship with China to be very positive for Nigeria. 
As the title suggests, Dati’s main interest is the Nigerian aviation sector, and also in 
this area he is very positive on the effect of the presidential visit to China. He argues 
that 
 
The signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Governments of Nigeria 
and China during the last trip marked a major milestone in the Nigerian aviation 
industry because it has opened up the industry in particular and the country as a whole, 
to the enormous economic opportunities that China provides today (The Guardian, 
2013B). 
 
As was the case with Engwegbara’s articles, this opinion piece reflects a positive 
Nigerian perception of China, which also means that this piece is another example of 
hard power elements (the tangible agreements between the two countries) that have an 
impact on the Chinese soft power in Nigeria. 
On the other side of the spectrum are two almost identical articles from The Punch 
and Vanguard, both written by the economist and Managing Director of Cocosheen 
Nigeria Limited, Henry Boyo (while the article in Vanguard is credited to Boyo’s 
pseudonym Les Leba). The articles, which are both called Euro & China loans: A 
Nation’s folly? (no question mark in the title in Vanguard), are almost identical in 
their content, which is mainly a criticism of Nigeria’s debt accumulation. Boyo argues 
that even though “there is everything to be said in favor of cheap or concessionary 
loans, which are dedicated to specific infrastructural improvement”, the 1.29 billion 
USD loan that was made during the President’s visit to China may be seen as 
inappropriate. Boyo argues that the loan, which was tied to the construction of four 
airport terminals and a hydropower station, could be compared to projects in sectors 
such as education, health, water, and mass transport, which are more people-oriented 
and thus have a greater social impact. 
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Furthermore, Boyo argues that the Chinese have failed to impress with the quality 
of their infrastructural interventions in several African countries, and they have not 
shown much affinity for adopting significant local content (human/material) in such 
ventures” (The Punch, 2013F). Boyo also criticizes an investment made by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria in China’s interbank bond market, because “the CBN would 
in effect lend to China so that Nigeria could borrow from China for our 
infrastructural enhancement”, which he considers farcical and distressful (The Punch, 
2013F). These statements (which are almost similar in both papers) are definitely 
reflections of negative Nigerian perceptions of China, and they are thus also examples 
of China’s soft power being affected by agreements that are made in spheres, which 
we would consider to be relating to hard power because they are concerning tangible 
economic interactions. 
The opinion letter Still on Jonathan’s Visit to China from The Punch, written by 
Adewumi Adedoyin, is somewhere in between the outright positive and negative 
opinion pieces, as Adedoyin includes both positive and negative statements about the 
relationship between Nigeria and China. After arguing that China is a very important 
country and after describing the Sino-Nigerian relationship historically, Adedoyin 
argues that “the “flooding” of Nigerian market with cheap Chinese goods (…) has 
adversely affected domestic industries, especially in textiles mills and laying off of 
workers over the course of a decade. Also, the influx of fake and substandard goods 
from China is a cause for worry”. These statements are definitely negative on the 
impact of the Chinese involvement in Nigeria, and they therefore reflect negative 
Nigerian perceptions of China. However, Adedoyin is not exclusively negative on the 
Chinese involvement, and he actually considers the presidential visit to be a positive 
happening, as he argues: “The visit apparently is a sign of better things to come for 
Nigeria, but this is if and only IF the Nigerian government is sincere and transparent 
in the use of the funds for the purpose they are meant for, and any agreements signed 
must be of benefits to Nigeria, and not a sell-out” (The Punch, 2013G). While 
Adedoyin does express some caution here, it seems that his general opinion on the 
state-to-state relationship with China is that it can lead to benefits for Nigeria, if the 
government makes proper use of it. Therefore, we would argue that the relationship 
with China is presented as an opportunity for Nigeria in this piece, which means that 
it also reflects a positive Nigerian perception of China.  
 68 
Leo Stan Ekeh, Chairman of Nigerian tech company Zinox group, has written the 
article Achieving Sustainable Transformation with ICT in This Day. The majority of 
the article is not related to the presidential visit, but Ekeh does argue that the outcome 
from the visit “consolidates the rising profile of China as the dominant foreign power 
in development projects in Nigeria”. This statement does not seem to be either 
particularly positive or negative, since it is merely noting that China is increasing its 
presence in Nigeria, but Ekeh further argues that Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) “did not appear to get the pride of place that it deserves 
considering China’s status as the ICT workshop of the world”. While this can be 
interpreted as a sign of some disappointment on Ekeh’s part regarding the outcome of 
the visit, this statement also highlights the opportunities that cooperation with China 
offers, as it seems that Ekeh would have preferred an even greater cooperation (in the 
ICT area). 
This is also evident when Ekeh touches upon a Ghanaian partnership with China to 
produce tablets, as he writes: “That Ghanaian company was recently empowered by a 
loan of $20m from China, underwritten by the Government of Ghana. That is the kind 
of incentive that Nigerian OEMs need to go global” (This Day, 2013E). Thus, a 
partnership with China is presented as a lucrative option, and we consider this to be 
an example of attraction on Nigeria’s part towards China, and thus a positive Nigerian 
perception of China. Again, this could be interpreted as hard power opportunities 
leading to soft power attraction. 
The viewpoint article Emerging Nigeria: Between America and China from 
Vanguard and The Guardian deals with Nigeria’s relations to both the United States 
and China. Yushau Shuaib, author of the article and commentator on national issues, 
only touches briefly on the presidential visit, and he mainly deals with a new book by 
Kingsley Moghalu, a Deputy Governor at the Central Bank of Nigeria. Shuaib argues 
that “Nigeria should not only look towards the East or the West alone, it should also 
create an enabling environment to attract genuine investors devoid of diplomatic 
rhetoric and political grandstanding” (Vanguard, 2013C). Thus, this article does not 
argue in favor of choosing between China and USA, and it is fairly neutral on the 
relationship with China.  
Dr. Liu Xianfa, the Consul-General of the People’s Republic of China, held a 
speech during the 64th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China 
in Lagos, and the piece Towards enhancing China-Nigeria relations, from The Punch, 
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is comprised of excerpts from this speech. As would probably be expected, Xianfa is 
positive on the relationship between China and Nigeria, and for instance remarks that 
 
President Jonathan paid a fruitful visit to China in July, and just a week ago, Mr. Zhang 
Deijang, Chairman of the National People’s Congress, in first trip abroad after taking 
office, paid a successful visit to Nigeria. Through these mutual visits, our leaders 
reached consensus on many important issues, injecting new impetus of bilateral relations 
(The Punch, 2013H). 
 
Here, it becomes evident how the presidential visits are seen as a symbol of the 
bilateral relations between China and Nigeria, and furthermore that they can be used 
as an occasion to portray this relationship positively. You probably would not expect 
a Chinese official to be negative on the relationship between China and Nigeria at a 
speech in Lagos, but our point in including this article, is that it is part of the Nigerian 
media picture. Therefore, this article also reflects a positive perception of the Sino-
Nigerian relationship in the debate taking place in Nigeria, as it is definitely 
expressing a benign message. However, it obviously does not express a Nigerian 
perception of China, since Xianfa is Chinese. 
In the same vein, the interview article with China’s ambassador in Nigeria, Nigeria 
is China’s strategic partner – Amb. Boqing is a very positive assessment of the 
relationship between China and Nigeria. Boqing for example argues: “I believe 
President Jonathan’s visit to China will further consolidate the traditional friendship 
between China and Nigeria, enhance strategic mutual trust, expand pragmatic 
bilateral cooperation, and promote further development of China-ECOWAS and 
China-Africa relations” (Vanguard, 2013D). Again, we see that the visit is used as an 
occasion to portray the bilateral relations positively, and again we would not expect a 
negative opinion from China’s ambassador in Nigeria. This article is nevertheless a 
part of the Nigerian media picture, and thus it also reflects a positive perception of the 
Sino-Nigerian relationship in the debate taking place in Nigeria. 
Finally, two short opinion letters are both highly negative. Lessons from China 
trip?, by Ajagba V. N., for example rhetorically asks concerning the President: 
 
Did he see heaps of refuse, potholed roads, open dirty gutters, noisy motor parks, rickety 
vehicles on the streets etc? Did he ever have some minutes with Chinese authorities to 
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share some tips on governance? Did he ask the Chinese authorities how corrupt 
government officials are treated? (The Punch, 2013I). 
 
 While this is most evidently a very negative letter, it is a little unclear to us 
whether Ajagba’s criticism is directed at China or at the Nigerian government, or 
maybe both. Nigeria-China pact, by Omorodion Czars, is also a criticism in relation 
to the visit, and Czars argues: “The China I know will be the master and Nigeria the 
servant” (The Punch, 2013J). It seems clear that both of these letters reflect negative 
perceptions of the relationship with China. 
 
4.2.3. Subconclusion 
As we have outlined in this section, there have both been examples of positive, 
negative, and neutral opinion pieces on the President’s visit to China. However, we 
consider there to be a certain predominance of positive opinions. This is based on the 
finding that out of the 11 pieces examined here, we consider six of them to be positive 
– the ones by Enwegbara (2), Dati, Ekeh, Xianfa, and the interview with Boqing – 
while we consider three to be negative – the ones by Boyo, Czars and Ajagba. The 
last two – the ones by Adedoyin and Shuaib – we consider to be neutral. 
Many of these positive opinions have been concerning the opportunities that 
cooperation with China offers, and also that China’s economic model can be a role 
model for Nigeria. Both of these elements are related to the economic success of 
China, which shows the interconnectedness between the tangible economic success 
and the attraction that it causes, and thus it is also an example of the 
interconnectedness between hard and soft power. Thus, China’s economic success 
becomes a source of Chinese soft power in Nigeria, which correlates very well with 
Nye’s argument that a successful economy can cause a soft power pull of attraction. 
Furthermore, we see the presidential visit as a symbol of the state-to-state 
cooperation between Nigeria and China, as it is an arena where foreign policy is 
displayed and formulated. We find it difficult to assess how much the debate on the 
presidential visit in all these opinion pieces reflect the general Nigerian perceptions of 
China, but as we have argued throughout this section, we do consider the opinion 
pieces to be reflecting Nigerian perceptions to some degree, mostly positive ones. 
What should be noted in this context, however, is that of the ten people 
(Enwegbara has two articles) who express themselves on China and on the Sino-
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Nigerian relationship in the opinion pieces, seven of them are participating in a rather 
‘elitist’ part of the debate in Nigeria: One is a regular columnist (Enwegbara), one is a 
Managing Director (Boyo), one is a Coordinating General Manager (Dati), one is a 
Chairman (Ekeh), one is a commentator on national issues (Shuaib), one is Consul-
General (Xianfa), and finally one is an Ambassador (Boqing). Thus, it becomes clear 
that the debate on China and the Sino-Nigerian relationship in the four newspapers is 
characterized by being rather elitist. As the newspapers are channeling the, mostly 
positive, narratives of these people to the Nigerian public, it could be that these 
opinion pieces come to have an effect, which is also mostly positive, on Chinese soft 
power in Nigeria following Nye’s argument about narratives being the currency of 
soft power. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the discourse in this debate is constructing the 
social reality of the Sino-Nigerian relationship and producing ‘the truth’ about it as 
something that is mostly positive. This means that the presidential visit and the 
coverage in relation to it could become sources of soft power in themselves through 
these narratives. 
 
4.3. The portrayal of the Sino-Nigerian relationship 
A country cannot have total control of its own soft power, as Nye explains. An 
important amount of American soft power thus comes from American food chains 
and brands working almost across the entire globe. As the Chinese economy is still 
highly controlled by the state, one might argue that China has a greater control of its 
soft power. While this can easily be the truth, it is still impossible for the Chinese 
government to obtain total control of its soft power, since soft power to a large degree 
is based on other peoples’ perception of this particular country. The soft power of 
China in Nigeria is thus partly shaped by how Nigerian media portrays the Chinese 
involvement in Nigeria. This is what we will demonstrate and investigate in this part 
of the analysis. By conducting a content analysis of Internet news articles from the 
four Nigerian newspapers The Guardian, Vanguard, Punch, and This Day, we wish to 
examine the use of sources, and how these provide a certain image of the specific 
Sino-Nigerian relations, hence the articles also serve as a certain image of China. 
In our analysis of 62 news articles from 2013, all covering a specific Sino-Nigeria 
relationship having a more or less direct effect on Nigeria and its people, we have 
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coded the types of sources occurring in the articles as well as their quoted perception 
(positive or negative) of the relationship and of China. This chapter will go in depth 
with our findings by first assessing the types of sources used in the articles and second 
assessing the quoted perception of the sources. 
 
4.3.1. Types of sources: overweight of professional interests 
The types of sources alone can tell a lot about the arguments being presented in a 
news article, since the title in itself can display the interests and impact of a source. 
As shown in table 6, exhibiting the perception of the different types of sources, as a 
share of the number of that source type used in the articles, a certain perception of 
both the China-Nigeria relationship and China alone seems to follow with the 
different source types. Let us have a quick look at that, before assessing the amount of 
source types in the articles. 
As the table shows, there is a high share of positive quoted perceptions amongst 
representatives of the Nigerian and Chinese state (government and official sources) as 
well as amongst representatives of firms. Civilians and oppositional voices are only 
quoted as critical (or neutral) on the relation, whereas 3rd party sources (experts, 
commentators, foreign organisations, foreign firms, or others where nationality is 
irrelevant) stand for the most diversified perception, though mainly critical on the 
relation. Organization representatives are the most surprising factor, as these are only 
quoted with a positive perception on the relation or China. With this overall view on 
the quoted perception of the sources, we will now assess to which degree the different 
types of sources are used in the articles. 
 
Table 6: Quoted perception as a share of sources37 
                                                
37 Note that one source can have more than one quoted perception, and that neutral quotes are not 
coded, for which reason the total percentage can both be higher or smaller than 100. Sources irrelevant 
to the China-Nigeria relation are left out. 
  
Positive on 
the relation 
Critical on 
the relation 
Positive on 
China 
Critical on 
China 
Government 48% 6% 8% 0% 
Official 47% 11% 3% 3% 
Firm 47% 0% 0% 0% 
3rd party 21% 50% 7% 7% 
Organization 67% 0% 67% 0% 
Civilian 0% 50% 0% 0% 
Opposition 0% 100% 0% 0% 
 73 
Table 7 is an overview of the total amount of sources, with Nigerian and Chinese 
sources divided. A total of 146 sources have been used in the 62 articles of which 9 
were irrelevant to the China-Nigeria relation, resulting in a total of 137 sources that 
have relevance to the China-Nigeria relation. Table 8 unveils a high amount of 
Nigerian sources, which is no surprise as the newspapers are all Nigerian. However, it 
is relevant to note that Chinese sources only appear 35 times in 62 articles, since this 
leaves most of the mediation of the relationship to Nigerian sources. 3rd party sources 
that spectate the relation from outside only appear 14 times, leaving the articles with 
an insignificant amount of impartial voices. 
Since the analysis investigates a relation and not a confrontation between China 
and Nigeria, we assign higher importance to the title of the source, rather than the 
nationality of the source. Thus, we will now proceed to assess the title of the sources. 
 
Table 7: Total number of sources   Table 8: Representation of nationality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When leaving nationality out of the equation, we get a clear view of the amount of 
the different types of sources, showing a clear overrepresentation of sources that 
presumptively have an interest in portraying the relationship between China and 
Nigeria positively, which table 6 also supported. 
Table 9 reveals a great overrepresentation of sources representing the government 
or the state in any way (officials), which is a clear indication that the ones interested 
  Number of sources 
Nig. government 53 
Nig. official 23 
Chi. official 15 
3rd party 14 
Chi. firm 10 
Chi. government 9 
Irrelevant source 9 
Nig. firm 7 
Nig. organization 2 
Nig. civilian 2 
Nig. opposition 1 
Chi. organization 1 
Chi. opposition 0 
Chi. civilian 0 
Total 146 
  Number of sources 
Nigerian 88 
Chinese 35 
3rd party 14 
Total 137 
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in the relationship between China and Nigeria are also the ones getting speaking time 
in the newspapers. On the other hand, the types of sources that assumably could stand 
for an oppositional or an impartial voice are greatly underrepresented. 
As table 10 shows, the majority of subjects discussed in the articles are subjects 
concerning a Nigerian federal relationship to China, where government 
representatives or officials have an interest in portraying a good relationship. When 
there is a high overweight of these source types, probably only the positive side is 
portrayed. In the paragraph on quoted perceptions, we will further investigate if this is 
also the fact. 
Table 9: Number of relevant sources, no nationality  
  Number of sources 
Government 62 
Official 38 
Firm 17 
3rd party 14 
Organization 3 
Civilian 2 
Opposition 1 
Total 137 
 
Table 10: Number of times subjects appear in articles 
  Subject appearing 
Governmental/federal cooperation 19 
State loans/debt 14 
Diplomatic visit/meeting 13 
Outsourcing / state company sale 9 
Discussing overall relationship 8 
Investment 7 
Business cooperation 7 
Trade, Chi. --> Nig. 3 
Trade, Nig. --> Chi. 3 
About Chinese firm operating in Nig. 2 
Aid 2 
Cultural event w/ Chinese participation 1 
Other 1 
Total 89 
 
Chart 2 provides an even clearer overview of the overweight of governmental 
sources and officials. If including firm representatives, who according to table 6 are 
only quoted with a positive (or neutral) perception, the share of sources with a 
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professional interest in the China-Nigeria relationship becomes even bigger. In fact, if 
putting the three source types together, the share of sources with a professional 
interest in the relationship is 85%, which means that these source types comprise 
more than 4 out of 5 of the total number of sources. 
3rd party sources, which are assumed to have an impartial view on the relationship, 
comprise 1 out of 10 of the total number of sources, whereas organizations, civilians 
and oppositional political voices comprise less than 5%38. These latter source types 
could be interpreted as having a critical view on the relationship, since subjects such 
as outsourcing of jobs, working conditions and the popular dubbing of the relationship 
as new colonialism may concern these source types. As table 6 shows, civilians and 
oppositional political voices also stand for a generally critical view, but organizations 
stand for a solely positive (or neutral) quoted perception, leaving the critical voices a 
very small platform in the part of the media image that is under our analytical 
magnifying glass. In fact, as table 9 shows, civilians only appear twice, and 
oppositional political voices only appear once in the 62 articles, making their voices 
almost inaudible. 
 
 
                                                
38 Note that the total number does not equate to 100%, since decimals have been left out of the chart. 
The numbers are thus also approximate values. 
6&<(85S(591!GF[!
;>_0=0371!"K[!
^08S1!$"[!
C84!)389,1!$:[!
;8B350`390&51!"[!J0<070351!$[! ;))&'090&51!$[!
H/3'&#6?#.:=01#(@#'080G3%&#1(*'+01U#=+&"#
C(#%3&,(%38,&:#
 76 
With this paragraph on the types of sources used, we have tried to illustrate the big 
overweight of sources with a professional interest in the China-Nigeria relation 
described in the articles. This has led to the conclusion that there might be a high 
overweight of quotes portraying the relationship between China and Nigeria as well 
as China itself positively. However, we cannot make this conclusion without knowing 
the overall perception portrayed in the articles. Thus, this analytical subchapter will 
now proceed to investigating the quoted perception of the different types of sources as 
well as the total number of sources. 
 
4.3.2. Quoted perceptions: overweight of positive perceptions 
The quoted perceptions of the sources in the articles play a major role in how the 
matters discussed in the articles are portrayed. Politicians, interest groups, and other 
opinion shapers provide the political quotes, whereas commentators, experts, and 
other sources observing the matter from the sideline provide the impartial, often 
research-based quotes. Political sources are generally widely used by the media, but if 
these sources only represent one side of the political spectrum, the articles become 
weighted, only portraying one opinion on the matter to the public. This paragraph will 
investigate the quoted perception of the sources in order to unveil these possible 
biases. 
As table 11 shows, the quotes of the sources have been coded as either positive or 
negative on the relationship discussed (state loans, trade, diplomatic visits etc.), as 
well as on China itself (for instance if a source commends the Chinese economic 
model)39. We will begin by looking into the quoted perceptions of the relationship, 
and after this look into the quoted perceptions on China only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 Note that as the sources can be quoted for more than one perception, and as neutral quotes are not 
coded, the total number of quoted perceptions can both be higher or lower than the total number of 146 
sources. In this case, the number of quoted perceptions is 89 – 57 lower than the number of sources. 
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Table 11: Quoted perception of the different source types 
  
Types of 
sources 
Positive 
on the 
relation 
Critical 
on the 
relation 
Positive 
on China 
Critical 
on China 
Nig. government 53 26 3 3 0 
Nig. Official 23 11 4 1 1 
Chi. Official 15 7 0 0 0 
3rd party 14 3 7 1 1 
Chi. Firm 10 5 0 0 0 
Chi. government 9 4 1 2 0 
Irrelevant source 9 0 0 0 0 
Nig. Firm 7 3 0 0 0 
Nig. organization 2 1 0 1 0 
Nig. Civilian 2 0 1 0 0 
Nig. opposition 1 0 1 0 0 
Chi. organization 1 1 0 1 0 
Chi. opposition 0 0 0 0 0 
Chi. Civilian 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of 
sources 146 61 17 9 2 
 
Chart 3 provides a good overview of the perception portrayed in the articles. It 
shows a positive quoted perception that is more than three times higher than the 
quoted critical perception on the relation – 61 against 17. With the total number of 
137 relevant sources, even the 61 quoted positive perceptions can seem like a small 
number, but since the unregistered perceptions were assessed as neutral and thus do 
not drag in one direction or the other, the general weighting of the articles is still 
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mainly positive. 
In order to make this image clearer, table 12 shows the number of articles with 
most positive or negative quoted perceptions, respectively. Also here the weight tilts 
heavily towards the positive side with 34 articles containing a majority of positive 
quoted perceptions, 5 articles mainly having negative quoted perceptions, and 23 
articles where either no quoted perception has been found, or the numbers of negative 
and positive quoted perceptions are the same. 
 
Table 12: The dominant perception in the articles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the overall tone and the approach of the articles cannot be shown, since 
the coding has only involved sources, the majority of positive quoted perceptions and 
the vast majority of articles with a majority of positive quoted perceptions gives a 
clear indication that the China-Nigeria relation is portrayed predominantly positive by 
the four big Nigerian newspapers investigated. 
 
As chart 4 shows, there is only a quoted perception of China 11 times in the 62 
articles, among 137 relevant sources. Thus, although the positive quoted perception is 
more than four times as high as the negative quoted perception, we deem this of little 
importance due to the very small amount of quoted perceptions of China. As a result, 
we will not go deeper into an assessment of the quoted perceptions of China. 
 
Articles 
Most positive perceptions 34 
Most negative perceptions 5 
Neutral (same amount or 
none) 23 
Total 62 
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4.3.3. Subconclusion 
As we continuously have remarked in the analysis, Joseph Nye notes that an 
important part of country’s soft power lies in foreigners’ perception of this particular 
country. With this analytical chapter we have tried to go one step back to assess one 
of the places from where this perception might be formed. For as we mentioned in the 
introduction of this chapter, the perception of the Nigerian population toward China is 
not merely shaped by the actions of the Chinese, but as well through the window from 
which they are observed. As Nye argues, a country’s soft power therefore depends on 
several different actors. Thus, the Nigerian media plays a pivotal role in shaping the 
Nigerian perception of China. 
As we have shown, the 62 Internet news articles from the four newspapers The 
Guardian, Vanguard, The Punch, and This Day, dealing with a part of the China-
Nigeria relationship, have a very high overweight of sources connected to the 
Nigerian or Chinese government. This leaves very little room for critical voices, 
letting sources with an interest in the relationship paint a great part of the picture that 
is being received by the Nigerian population. 
This artistic licence of sources connected to the state may be an important factor to 
why the second part of this analysis also found a high overweight of positive quoted 
perceptions. This finding further adds to the argument that the articles portraying the 
China-Nigeria relations predominantly shows only one side of the coin. The fact that 
35 articles have a majority of positive quoted perceptions to the relation as opposed to 
only 5 articles with a majority of negative quoted perceptions is a clear indication that 
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the vast majority of the articles portray the relationship uncritically, leaving a positive 
impression to the Nigerian population. 
We began this subconclusion by saying that we went back to investigate from 
where the Nigerian perception of China may be formed. Although this is what we 
have now done, it is crucial to bear in mind that we are not able to provide the link 
between the two, and thus we cannot conclude that there is causation between the 
one-sided media portrayal and the perception of the Nigerian population shown in the 
first part of the analysis. However, our analysis indicates that the perception can very 
well be shaped through the media, since the heavy amount of positive perceptions 
may contribute to tipping the scale of the Nigerian population towards a positive 
perception of China and its relationship to Nigeria, just like this portrayal may 
produce a ‘regime of truth’ of the relationship. Drawing upon Nye’s notion of indirect 
soft power, this positive perception among Nigerians toward China may further very 
well affect the Nigerian state leaders in directions that will benefit China in the end. 
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5. Discussion 
In this chapter of discussion, we will take the opportunity to address some of the 
issues we previously have stressed as debatable, in regards to what we in this paper 
seek to illuminate. The limitations in respect to our research are mainly reflected 
through our (1) focus on the interconnectedness of soft and hard power, and (2) the 
unknown correlation between the positive Nigerian public perception towards the 
Chinese on the one side and the economic relationship between the two countries on 
the other. The three additional authors to Nye that we introduced in the chapter of 
theory, Mingjiang Li, Craig Hayden and Giulio Gallarotti, will be operationalized 
with in this discussion, as they might shed further light upon the abovementioned 
topics we are dealing with. We have addressed our limitations from both a 
methodological and empirical angle up until now, why a theoretical perspective will 
bring full circle to these shortcomings. 
 
The analysis on the sources of power in the Sino-Nigerian relationship illustrates a 
possible interconnectedness between the hard and soft power elements at play. The 
structure of the Chinese strategy is one that encompasses economic facets as well as 
political goals, making the many aspects of the Chinese power display a reciprocal 
unit. This was inter alia exemplified through the economic gains within the oil sector, 
which we argued could have been due to high level political interaction. Furthermore, 
the political interaction between the two countries was to be explained, in our opinion, 
upon several dimensions, including the elements of South-South cooperation, Chinese 
aid, and attraction towards a Chinese economic model, which underscores that the 
economic gains from the Sino-Nigerian partnership are not the only drivers of what is 
promoting this interstate cooperation. 
An increasing interaction between the Nigerian and Chinese governments might 
indicate that the Nigerian government is attracted towards the Chinese way of doing 
things. Argued in this regard was how these quite tangible concepts of aid and 
cooperation in themselves had become a facet of soft power, portrayed through the 
values and the foreign policies they represent. We further sought to illuminate how 
the positive Nigerian public perception might be correlated to the economic 
relationship between Nigeria and China, which our analysis of the Nigerian media 
sought to demonstrate.  
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A showcasing was made on how hard power facets can become soft power 
elements when you seek to determine how they are used, or as Mingjiang Li phrases 
it: “the soft use of power” (Li, 2009, s. 7). Li uses, similarly to our analysis, the 
exemplification of aid and how this element more traditionally has been regarded as a 
hard power carrot, but can become a symbol of soft power when it becomes a value 
in itself. He further notes that if one focuses alone on the sources of power, hard 
power sources might very well generate soft power, for which reason it is more 
important to analyze the use of power. 
Correspondingly, our foregoing analysis exemplified how Chinese aid has become 
a symbol through the South-South cooperation strategy and the win-win rhetoric 
around the subject. This aspect, of how hard power elements were generating soft 
power means, also came to show through the possible attraction that the Chinese 
economic model was generating. In this regard, the analysis heavily relied upon how 
the Nigerian media portrayed the Sino-Nigerian relationship, and thus creating a 
discourse around the subject. 
Similar to Li, we demonstrated in the analysis that focusing on the use of power, 
through our analysis of the media, helps us in greater detail understand the 
relationship between hard and soft power. If we simply categorize hard and soft 
power according to their theoretical sources/origins, we achieve little in utilizing the 
theory around the subject, but when we analyze how it is used, we achieve a greater 
understanding of the relationship between not only two countries but also how hard 
and soft power might be interconnected. 
Li addresses the gray area between hard and soft power, but does not elaborate 
much on the issue of correlation or causality between the two. If we want to fully 
determine the relationship between hard and soft power, a valuable practice in this 
respect would be to seek to create the linkages of how they are influencing one 
another. However, Craig Hayden’s framework on soft power illuminates an issue in 
respect to trying to determine such a linkage, and he specifically notes that analyzing 
causality between resources and certain outcomes is very difficult. Hayden notes in 
this respect that, because we have little knowledge on how soft power is used, we can 
solely identify the resources or outcomes of soft power, but not address the issue of 
linking these two elements together. In this context, we also find it relevant to 
introduce another consideration regarding soft-power resources and outcomes: is a 
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positive perception an outcome that a state seeks to achieve, or is it rather an element 
that can be wielded as a soft power means? 
While we have argued that China possibly could have achieved a positive public 
perception in Nigeria through their economic relationship, it should also be 
considered that the Nigerian positive perceptions of China could facilitate the 
economic interaction between the two countries. For example, the Nigerian 
government might be more inclined to make agreements with China, if Chinese 
economic opportunity is an element that is supported by the public, as Nye notes, and 
thus the positive perceptions of China would be a soft power resource, which China 
could manipulate with to its own advantages. This illustrates the interconnectedness 
between hard and soft power even more clearly, as it can be argued that if the Sino-
Nigerian economic relationship affects Chinese perceptions in Nigeria, and this could 
in turn be devised as a soft power resource in seeking to affect hard power facets like 
economic gains. This assessment brings forth a fairly complicated theoretical chain of 
correlation, where the tangible (hard power) economic relationship is a resource of 
soft power, while the positive public perception (soft power) is a resource of hard 
power. 
If one were to construct a research design able to tackle this notion, it could in our 
opinion be an interesting aspect to further investigate, in that it to an even greater 
degree illuminates the point in argument about the interconnectedness between hard 
and soft power. Further elaborating on Hayden’s point in argument about correlation, 
the example above demonstrates that it is not only difficult to identify the correlation 
between resources and outcomes, but sometimes distinguishing between the two can 
become an issue in itself. 
The framework that this paper has been dealing with is somewhat more 
complicated than both Hayden’s and Li’s, in that we seek to illuminate both soft and 
hard power, how these are used, whilst we also wish to address the linkage between 
the two. Thus, we are both dealing with Li’s focus on the use of power, and Hayden’s 
issue of correlation. The limitations of this paper become very exposed when we 
highlight these issues of correlation and the use of power, though it demonstrates that 
it is not only this paper dealing with such issues. 
The easiest way we could have dealt with these issues, would have been to 
completely steer around them, but then again; which contributions and results would 
this paper have been able to conclusively achieve? Not many in our opinion. The 
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paper would simply have been an identification of resources, outcomes, or the sources 
of power, but this does not illuminate much in the Sino-Nigerian case in our 
perspective, why we have chosen to tackle these issues and at least give an 
approximation of which linkages might exist. 
If we seek to legitimize our actions and research design from a theoretical 
standpoint, we could draw on Giulio Gallarotti’s understanding of soft power as a 
partially actor-based theory. In regards to an actor-based theory one must 
acknowledge that an important task is to analyze the interaction between these actors. 
In Gallarotti’s quoting of Peter Hall’s meta-power understanding, he illuminates that 
soft power is in part used to explain “the shaping of social relations, structures and 
situations between the actors themselves” (Gallarotti, 2011, s. 11). Likewise, we have 
in this paper sought to analyze soft power from its broader domain as an actor-based 
theory, why the social relations, structures and situations in the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship have been an important element to touch upon. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have sought to investigate the economic relationship between China 
and Nigeria, using Joseph Nye’s theoretical concept of soft power, whilst also seeking 
to portray interconnectedness between hard and soft power. The main objective of this 
paper has been to demonstrate that facets of the Sino-Nigerian economic relationship 
correlate to certain aspects of the Chinese soft power in Nigeria. Following thesis 
statement was devised as a navigational tool in our research: 
 
Investigating the economic features of the Sino-Nigerian relationship, together with 
the Nigerian media’s portrayal of this subject, projects an image of correlation 
between the hard and soft power elements at play, when paralleled with the findings 
of a positive Nigerian public perception towards the Chinese.  
 
Our analysis has sought to verify this thesis statement through a three-part structure, 
addressing different sides of the Sino-Nigerian relationship in terms of 
interconnectedness between hard and soft power: (1) an overview of the economic 
Sino-Nigerian relationship in terms of oil, trade, state-to-state interaction, and the 
multi-aspects of the South-South cooperation, leading to a conclusion of how these 
traditional hard power features may also play an important role in shaping the soft 
power of China; (2) portraying the elitist part of the debate concerning the Sino-
Nigerian relationship through an in-depth analysis of opinion pieces concerning the 
latest visit of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan to China, concluding that these 
opinions may have influenced the Nigerian public perception of China; (3) assessing 
how the general portrayal by the Nigerian media of the Sino-Nigerian relationship, 
may have influenced how this relationship is perceived in the Nigerian public, which 
arguably can be seen as a Chinese soft power resource. 
With the first part of the analysis we have outlined the economic relationship 
between China and Nigeria and in an ongoing fashion shown how this can both be 
interpreted as hard and soft power facets. China does not merely obtain important 
energy resources when buying crude oil from Nigeria, and Chinese aid is not only 
used as a carrot in order to get Nigeria to give something in return. Peeking behind 
the curtain of the seemingly tangible relationship, reveals underlying mechanisms that 
render the relationship far more intangible than what a first glance may indicate. 
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When the positive Nigerian public perception towards China is increased on the basis 
of China trading with Nigeria, and when Chinese aid comes with ‘no strings attached’ 
(in contrast to Western standards of good governance) promising South-South 
cooperation, the economic partnership becomes a soft power value for the Chinese.   
A predominant positive perception among the Nigerian public towards the Chinese 
was showcased through the use of several polls, which also served as the main soft 
power source that we used in our analysis of the Sino-Nigerian relationship. This 
positive public perception is important to keep in mind in regards to the economic 
relationship, and even though we cannot create the direct linkage between these two 
elements, it still serves as an indication of how soft and hard power can be 
interconnected when inspecting an economic relationship. 
With the second part of our analysis we sought to assess how this 
interconnectedness between soft and hard power becomes apparent through the 
presidential visit of Goodluck Jonathan in China July 2013. We argued that the 
presidential visit provides a prime example of this interconnectedness, since the many 
economic agreements between China and Nigeria signed during the visit were debated 
in a way which illustrated that China’s economic success causes attraction to China 
on Nigeria’s part. 
The assessment of the meeting was conducted through an analysis of opinion 
pieces concerning the visit, featured in Nigerian newspapers. The analysis sketched 
the elitist part of the debate and concluded that the positive perceptions of the meeting 
dominated this debate, which, we further concluded, might contribute to shaping the 
Nigerian public perception of the relationship in a positive direction. 
The argument that a great part of Chinese soft power is shaped through how 
Nigeria’s relationship to China is portrayed in the media was further assessed in the 
third and last part of our analysis. Here, we analyzed the Sino-Nigerian relationship as 
it was portrayed by the Nigerian media and concluded that this portrayal painted a 
predominantly positive picture of the relationship, which, we further argued, might 
have led to shaping the public perception accordingly. 
However, this paper comes short of answers when trying to provide the exact link 
between our findings on the Sino-Nigerian relationship including the portrayal of it on 
the one side, and the positive public perception – and thus Chinese soft power – on 
the other side. Though, we can conclude that soft power cannot be left out of the 
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equation when discussing the Sino-Nigerian economic relationship, and the positive 
public opinion among Nigerians towards the Chinese is a strong indication of this. 
As we have argued several times throughout the paper, the foreign public 
perception towards a country is an important part of soft power. If in fact Nigeria’s 
economic relations to China are instigating the shaping of Nigerian public perception 
towards China, it can be argued that China gains far more than what is apparent when 
only looking at the surface of this relationship. 
Related to points made in the Discussion, taking Joseph Nye’s notion of indirect 
soft power into consideration, unveils an extra soft power gain of the Chinese. Their 
soft power strategy may come full circle, if China through its economic relationship 
to Nigeria, in fact is shaping the Nigerian public perception towards China. For the 
Nigerian public may in the second coupling back their decision-makers when these 
seek to make new agreements with the Chinese, resulting in an even stronger 
relationship between the two and a double-benefitting strategy of the Chinese. 
However, whether this last link – creating the full circle – is in fact apparent, is a 
factor that we have not been able to conclude within the analytical framework of this 
paper. Closing the full circle thus relies on a new assessment of the Sino-Nigerian 
relationship building upon the findings made in this paper. 
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